Venezuela's corruption on the rise: fourteen years of Chávismo by Mercado, Frances V.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-09
Venezuela's corruption on the rise: fourteen
years of Chávismo
Mercado, Frances V.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
VENEZUELA’S CORRUPTION ON THE RISE: 








Thesis Advisor:  Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez 
Second Reader: Robert J. Looney 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the 
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2016 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
VENEZUELA’S CORRUPTION ON THE RISE: FOURTEEN YEARS OF 
CHÁVISMO 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Frances V. Mercado 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
This thesis seeks to answer two related questions regarding corruption and Chávismo. First, what 
factors contributed to the rise in Venezuela’s Corruption Perception Index from 2000–2014? Second, what 
does Venezuela need to do to reverse that trend? The thesis examines Hugo Chávez’s populist policies as 
well as two leading factors for the rise of corruption—weak governance and oil over-dependence 
practices—and analyzes the Resource Curse theory and Cháveznomics. Chávez’s populist policies created 
neo-patrimonial networks, increasing the intensity of corrupt practices between specific sectors of citizens 
and political elites. Cháveznomics policies also created a mismanagement of windfall oil rents, 
establishing a Rentier State for Venezuela. The Rentier State established corrupt patronage networks with 
state industries that remained intact under the high oil prices during 2000–2014. The thesis also conducts 
theoretical analysis of anti-corruption methods while considering Venezuelan societal elements of culture, 
political will, and international integration. State-center anti-corruption strategies prove to be an 
appropriate method for Venezuela’s societal elements and unique corruption environment. The proposed 
state-center strategies incorporate a three-prong anti-corruption approach, including political, economic, 
and social accountability reforms with market-friendly social democratic policies that build political will 
and civic engagement. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Hugo Chávez, corruption, Resource Curse, oil, populism, anti-
corruption, state center anti-corruption 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
167 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 




Frances V. Mercado 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.A., University of Texas, San Antonio, 2006  
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






















Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




This thesis seeks to answer two related questions regarding corruption and 
Chávismo. First, what factors contributed to the rise in Venezuela’s Corruption 
Perception Index from 2000–2014? Second, what does Venezuela need to do to reverse 
that trend? The thesis examines Hugo Chávez’s populist policies as well as two leading 
factors for the rise of corruption—weak governance and oil over-dependence practices—
and analyzes the Resource Curse theory and Cháveznomics. Chávez’s populist policies 
created neo-patrimonial networks, increasing the intensity of corrupt practices between 
specific sectors of citizens and political elites. Cháveznomics policies also created a 
mismanagement of windfall oil rents, establishing a Rentier State for Venezuela. The 
Rentier State established corrupt patronage networks with state industries that remained 
intact under the high oil prices during 2000–2014. The thesis also conducts theoretical 
analysis of anti-corruption methods while considering Venezuelan societal elements of 
culture, political will, and international integration. State-center anti-corruption strategies 
prove to be an appropriate method for Venezuela’s societal elements and unique 
corruption environment. The proposed state-center strategies incorporate a three-prong 
anti-corruption approach, including political, economic, and social accountability reforms 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are being called to save Venezuela from this immense and putrid 
swamp in which we have been sunk during forty years of demagoguery 
and corruption.  
 —Hugo Chávez Frías, 1999 Inaugural Speech1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer two related questions regarding corruption and 
Chávismo. First, what factors contributed to Venezuela’s rise in its Corruption Perception 
index from 2000–2014? Second, what does Venezuela need to do to reverse that trend?  
Corruption can destroy societies by risking their citizens’ livelihood and by 
eroding trust in a system that is meant to protect their interests. Transparency 
International states that “corruption corrodes the social fabric of society” and a 
“distrustful or apathetic public can then become yet another hurdle to challenging 
corruption.”2 Generally, corruption is a complex multifaceted issue that has several 
definitions; essentially, corruptive actions taken for private gain at the expense of the 
public. This thesis specifically defines corruption, in accordance with Transparency 
International’s definition, as “the abuse of power for private gain.”3  
Make no mistake, corruption was entrenched in Venezuela’s history before Hugo 
Frías Chávez was born, and the previous quote shows how he rose to power on an anti-
corruption platform. So how did Venezuela’s corruption perception increase in the 14 
years of Chávez’s presidency and how can that shift? Gustavo Coronel noted that, as 
early as 1813, Venezuelan political leaders recognized corruption within their polity and 
                                                 
1 Anthea McCarthy-Jones, “‘Ploughing the Sea’ in a World of Regions: Venezuela’s Role in Reviving 
Latin American Regionalism for the Twenty-First Century,” in Democracy, Revolution, and Geopolitics in 
Latin America: Venezuela and the International Politics of Discontent, ed. Luis Fernando Angosto-
Ferrández, Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2014), 48. 
2 “What Is Corruption?,” Transparency International, accessed January 30, 2016, 
http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define.  
3 “How Corrupt Is Your Country?,” Transparency International, (2014), http://www.transparency.org/
cpi2014/infographic. 
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incorporated harsh penalties to quell motivations.4 Coronel goes on to highlight that, 
during the early 20th century, corruption existed in the most concentrated parts of military 
dictators’ inner circles. Two factors in Venezuela’s history intensified corruption in 
Venezuelan politics. First, in 1954, was the birth of a charismatic leader, Hugo Chávez 
Frías.5 Second, four years later, was the initiation of democracy.6 
Venezuela was armed with a new system of democratic government, Punto Fijo, 
which worked to subdue party competition that threatened democracy’s success. Punto 
Fijo created a system where two main parties—mostly party leaders—shared spoils of the 
state.7 The clientelist network created enriched opportunities for more corruption and 
also resulted in a vast income inequality gap that, in turn, produced overwhelming 
feelings of alienation of the masses.8 Citizens’ feelings that their government has 
abandoned them fueled the mobilization and the later oil bust of the 1980s intensified 
that. Then, the decrease in oil revenues crippled the financial system causing severe 
austerity measures to social programs, which disproportionately affected the poorest 
segments of society.9 The contentious environment of the poor set the stage for Hugo 
Chávez and his “radical” approach to rid the country of corruption from the previous 
political elites. His campaign as the alternative to the political status quo had promises of 
eradicating corruption. Unfortunately, Chávez’s model of governance, Chávismo, 
increased the opportunity for corruption within his administration, leading to a 
disappointing blow for Venezuela’s populace who took a risk on him as their liberator.  
Despite his humble beginnings, Hugo Chávez quickly became a political hero. 
Hugo Chávez Frías was born in Sabaneta de Barinas, 525 kilometers from Caracas, on 
                                                 
4 Gustavo Coronel, “The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela,” Cato Institute, March 4, 2008, 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela 
5 Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin Uniforme: Una Historia Personal, 
ed. Cynthia Rodríguez (Mondadori, S.A.: Random House, 2004), 40.  
6 Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in 
Venezuela,” Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (February 2003): 64, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993630. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., 65. 
9 Ibid. 
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July 28, 1954.10 He was the second of six boys of Hugo de los Reyes Chávez and Elena 
Frías de Chávez.11 His family came from an underprivileged background; his father 
taught school in Barinas.12 Along with his older brother, Hugo Chávez was raised by his 
paternal grandmother in order to lessen the burden on the nuclear family.13 In 1971, 
Chávez entered the military academy where the teachings of Venezuelan liberator, Simón 
Bolívar, shaped the revolutionary spirit that inspired his Bolivarian Revolution.14 The 
Academia Militar experienced reforms in 1970 to become a university-equivalent 
institution with training focused on leadership themed in the “mystique of honor, 
discipline, and self-sacrifice.”15 According to Harold Trinkunas, the curriculum created 
officers with a nationalist spirit using the teachings of Simón Bolívar along with 
“populist, egalitarian, and ultimately [an] utilitarian perspective toward democracy.”16 
Chávez’s generation of officers had a superior attitude compared to civilian politicians, a 
notion, according to Brian Loveman, derived from the fact that for military officers, in 
Latin America, educational opportunities were of the highest quality in the state.17 This 
sense of superiority legitimized the military as the only viable institution to provide 
pressure on the seemingly corrupt government.  
Chávez military career involved attempts to handle Punto Fijo administrations’ 
corrupt practices through force. During Carlos Andrés Pérez’s presidency, in the late 
1980s, the public’s perception of a corrupt government culminated because of how Punto 
Fijo’s system concentrated spoils to the political elites. The public saw the government as 
                                                 
10 Marcano and Tyszka, Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme: Una Historia Personal, 36.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Marcano and Tyszka, Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme: Una Historia Personal, 36. 
13 Marcano and Tyszka, Hugo Chávez Sin Uniforme: Una Historia Personal, 36. 
14 Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela : A Comparative 
Perspective (Chapel Hill, NC,: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 177, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/
alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10273445. 
15 Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela, 177. 
16 Ibid., 178. 
17 Brian Loveman, For La Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, 
Delaware: A Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999), 15. 
 4 
“weak and exhibit[ing] clear signs of corruption.”18 Resentment toward the government’s 
corruption had also grown throughout the military. The military disenchantment grew 
during their participation in suppressing protests throughout Venezuela on February 27, 
1989. Caracazo, as the protests were called, were revolts accomplished throughout the 
state over the most recent austerity measures of the Pérez administration, including 
increases in food and oil prices and decline in social programs.19 According to Julia 
Buxton, the austerity measures “exacerbated structural and macroeconomic imbalances in 
the economy and had a critical impact on living standards, which had already witnessed a 
substantive deterioration.”20 The government than activated the military to suppress the 
movement through coercive means; Many military members were torn because they 
sympathized with the movement.21 By the time the military engaged in stopping the riots, 
there were anywhere from 372 (official record) to 2,000 (unofficially) people killed in 
Caracas alone with thousands more wounded.22 From that moment, according to Retired 
Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Urdaneta, the only viable means to initiate change was through 
force.23 Margarita López Maya explains that Caracazo had troops in leadership positions 
at the time of the riots, that felt “shame, indignation, and a sense of having defended the 
wrong side,” while the riots themselves exposed the “weakness of political 
institutions.”24 Caracazo laid the legitimatization necessary for disgruntled military 
members including Hugo Chávez to stage a coup in 1992. 
                                                 
18 The Hugo Chavez Show, directed by Ofra Bikel, PBS Frontline, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/hugochavez/view/. 
19 Julia Buxton, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez,” in Venezuelan Politics in the 
Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict, ed. Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2003); 113; Patricia Márquez, “The Hugo Chávez Phenomenon: What Do ‘The People’ 
Think?,” in Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict, ed. Steve Ellner and 
Daniel Hellinger (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 201.  
20 Buxton, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez,” 114. 
21 The Hugo Chavez Show.  
22 Richard Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela 
(New York: Verso, 2000), 46. 
23 The Hugo Chavez Show.  
24 Margarita López Maya, “Hugo Chávez Frías: His Movement and His Presidency,” in Venezuelan 
Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization and Conflict, ed. Steve Ellner and Daniel 
Hellinger(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 76, 77. 
 5 
Members of the Venezuelan armed forces anti-corruption methods involved 
removing political officials through force. Venezuela’s economy collapsing and the 
public enraged with the government established the foundation for the military to take 
action in 1992. A group of military officers with political views created the Moviemento 
Bolivariano Revolutionario 200 (MBR 200) as a means to participate in change for the 
country. The group consisted of military men who formed goals based on the problems of 
the country. Lieutenant Colonel Urdaneta reminisced that the group “wanted to liberate 
Venezuela from corruption and inequality.”25 On February 3, 1992, the coup began with 
key locations hit including the Presidential Residence “La Casona,” Miraflores Place, 
Generalísimo Francisco Miranda air base, military headquarters at Fuerte Tiuna army 
barracks, along with four major cities’ government and economic installations.26 Despite 
the successful objectives of obtaining control of these places, the coup did not meet the 
most crucial ambition, to remove President Pérez from office. The coup resulted in Hugo 
Chávez’s incarceration.27 Hugo Chávez’s aim had been to “liberate” Venezuela from the 
political elites that undermined the country; ironically, his television address assumed 
blame for the defeat and a call to his compatriots to lie down arms.28 Chávez famous 
words of “Por Ahora” or “for now” opened the future to what would be his “Bolivarian 
Revolution.”29 The focus was on the redistribution of wealth to the poor and ridding the 
state from the “immense and putrid swamp…[of] corruption.”30 Teodoro Petkoff claimed 
“[his] words fell as rain on dry soil.”31 Hugo Chávez’s popularity rose at that moment 
and gave him a chance to change the political system with his election in 1998.  
                                                 
25 The Hugo Chávez Show. 
26 Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela, 156. 
27 The Hugo Chavez Show. 
28 The Hugo Chavez Show. 
29 The Hugo Chávez Show. 
30 Anthea McCarthy-Jones, “‘Ploughing the Sea’ in a World of Regions: Venezuela’s Role in 
Reviving Latin American Regionalism for the Twenty-First Century,” in Democracy, Revolution, and 
Geopolitics in Latin America: Venezuela and the International Politics of Discontent, ed. Luis Fernando 
Angosto-Ferrández, Routledge Studies in Latin American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
31 Teodoro Petkoff, interview by FRONTLINE, ,” accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/hugoChávez/interviews/petkoff.html#poor. 
 6 
During Chávez’s incarceration from the failed coup in 1992, the ideals of the 
movement began to shift from a violent revolt establishing to a peaceful democracy. The 
principles of the Bolivarian movement began to take a more democratic approach, 
abandoning violence as a means to promote change.32 Individuals like José Vicente 
Rangel, Edmundo Chirinos, and Luis Miquilena assisted in Chávez’s transformation from 
military subversive to presidential candidate. One method was the transformation of the 
MBR 200 into the Moviemento Quinta Republica (MVR) political party.33 Chávez was 
than able to enter political office in 1998 with a landslide victory, becoming, at 44 years 
old, the youngest Venezuelan president ever.34 According to Patricio Silva, “the 
population is even disposed to elect [a] ex-putschist military [leader]… and put their 
hopes on a ‘strong man’ who is expected to eliminate criminality and corruption and to 
provide economic prosperity that traditional democratic forces have so far been unable to 
achieve.”35 The election of 1998 solidified the expectation that an outsider could fix 
corruption in Venezuela rather than the old political elites. 
The victory in 1998 saw the start of a 14-year presidency of Hugo Chávez and a 
new populist political system that removed all remnants of the previous political system 
and replaced it with the Chávismo political model. He created a new constitution, 
centralized power in the executive branch, and created a myriad of social programs to 
improve the situation for the poor.36 There were notable changes in the country’s 
democratic institutions as well as its international position. Chávez removed the senate, 
extended presidential term limits to six years, gained decree powers to initiate laws, and 
politicized all economic and military institutions.37 Internationally, Venezuela distanced 
                                                 
32 The Hugo Chavez Show. 
33 Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” 
66; Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: una historia personal, 41. 
34 Marcano and Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin uniforme: una historia personal, 31. 
35 Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” 66. 
36 Kirk A. Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 18, 20. 
37 Gustavo Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez’s 
Venezuela,” Development Policy Analysis (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, November 27, 2006) 4; Kirk 
A. Hawkins, Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 17. 
 7 
itself from the United States and created alliances with Cuba and Russia with the goal of 
becoming an influential regional player.38 However, despite the strong rhetoric and 
radical programs attempted, Jon Lee Anderson notes that a decade under Chávez’s 
presidency is difficult to comprehend because “we do not see huge changes, [and] most 
of his inventions or missions to elevate social ills at home have not worked.”39 Thus, 
perceived corruption has risen, necessitating further study.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
Because corruption is such a complex concept, it is important to comprehensively 
examine it before addressing how it has affected Venezuela. Transparency International 
defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.”40 Alina Rocha 
Menocal et al. defines corruption as “the misuse of resources or power for private 
gain.”41 Gustavo Coronel defines government corruption as “the violation of the public 
interest for personal or partisan gain.”42 Each definition contains a core similarity, 
summed up as “the abuse of power for private gain.”43 Transparency International 
categorizes corruption into three broad categories: grand, bureaucratic, and systematic.44 
These levels identify to what extent or capacity corruption occurs; grand corruption 
occurs at the highest levels of political office, bureaucratic corruption at the government 
or non-governmental level, and systematic corruption at the “interaction of the state and 
private actors in a contaminated social system.”45  
                                                 
38 Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” 71. 
39 The Hugo Chávez Show. 
40 Alina Rocha Menocal et al., “Why Corruption Matters: Understanding Causes, Effects and How to 
Address Them,” Evidence Paper (UK: Department of International Development, January 2015), 54, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/why-corruption-matters-understanding-causes-effects-and-
how-to-address-them.  
41 Ibid., 12. 
42 Gustavo Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez’s 
Venezuela,” Development Policy Analysis (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, November 27, 2006), 8. 
 43 “What Is Corruption?,” Transparency International. 
44 Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power,” 9. 
45 Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power,” 9–14. 
 8 
Corruption is a difficult phenomenon to pinpoint; however, corruption indices can 
give a snapshot of the situation in Venezuela. In 2000, Transparency International scored 
Venezuela 2.7 out of 10 and ranked Venezuela 71 out of 90 countries.46 In 2011, 
Venezuela’s Corruption Perception Index score dropped to 1.9.47 By 2014, however, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception index identified Venezuela as the 
most corrupt country in Latin America with a score of 19 out of 100, where 0 is the most 
corrupt and 100 the cleanest, and assigned it a global ranking of 161 out of 175.48 In 
other words, Venezuela went from being a moderate to the worst ranking over a 14-year 
period under two Presidents who both claimed that their primary objective was to 
“eliminate corruption.”49  
Civilians’ perception of the government’s approach to corruption saw a 
deteriorating shift as well. In 2000, Latinobarómetro identified that, out of 1200 
respondents, 54.3% of the citizens answered that corruption had “increased a lot.”50 By 
2002, 73.5% believed corruption had “increased a lot.”51 During the 2006 election year, 
however, the perception began to change with Latinobarómetro question of “How much 
progress do you think has been made on reducing corruption in the State’s institutions 
during the last two years?”52 According to the results, 28% felt some progress was made. 
The success stemmed from an apparent motivation by President Chávez to use anti-
corruption actions to ensure votes in the following election season. Federico Fuentes 
highlights several former elected officials, both opposition and Chavistas (Pro-Chávez 
supporters), that were charged with corruption along with the former defense minister 
linked with the disappearance of $14.4 million from the defense ministry’s budget in that 
                                                 
46 “How Corrupt Is Your Country?,” Transparency International, accessed January 23, 2016, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/infographic. 
47 “Corruption Perceptions Index Report 2011,”Transparency International, 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2000/0/. 
48 Ibid. 
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time-frame.53 Those actions, however, did not make lasting changes in corruption, but 
they did ensure reelection. By 2008, the numbers changed with the same question as the 
2006 report resulted in 32.3% believed that “no progress [at] all is being made.”54 
Furthermore, in 2013, Latinobarómetro questioned, “How widespread do you think 
corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal government?” From 1200 
respondents, 36% answered that most officials are corrupt.55 Thus, the perception of 
corruption among its citizens noted no significant improvements. 
During Chávez’s presidency, beyond the perception of corruption, there was 
physical evidence of corruption penetrating several aspects of Venezuelan society from 
food programs, healthcare, and the bureaucracies that control those basic goods. In 2005, 
the Supreme Court purchased land for 78 million bolivars to build 300 courts in Caracas; 
however, 10 years later, nothing was built.56 Transparencía Venezuela identified, in 
2007–2008, “various irregularities” found in the purchase of food by the state and 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the state owned oil company, that led to over one 
million tons of food purchased with only a little more than 25% of the food received and 
14% of that food distributed.57 According to Transparencía Venezuela, the investigations 
into these issues are nonexistent.58 Other signs of corruption were linked directly to Hugo 
Chávez’s family. His father, Hugo de los Reyes Chávez, became governor of their home 
state of Barinas, while Chávez’s brothers enjoyed other political positions at the state and 
local levels, elevating their status to wealthy elites.59 Secrecy surrounds how they came 
into their money and, in 2008; investigations into allegations of illegal enrichment were 
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placed on hold.60 Corruption not only rose in occurrences in Venezuela, but it became 
increasingly difficult to investigate allegations to hold those accused accountable. 
Chávez’s revolution exposes the opportunities of corruption among its basic 
framework. Francisco Rodríguez notes that Chávez’s revolution is more of an “empty” 
one with “little data supporting the claim that the Chávez administration has acted any 
differently from previous Venezuelan governments—or, for that matter, from those of 
other developing and Latin American nations.”61 The economic growth throughout 
Chávez’s presidency ensured the revenue to support his social initiatives; however, there 
were no signs of improvement. Mercedes de Freitas states that “poor governance, a 
concerted effort to quash the voice of the people coupled with rampant corruption are 
leading Venezuela to a terrible destiny.”62 The Bolivarian Revolution is showing signs of 
the past with corruption worsening rather than improving. 
Corruption has negative implications for peace. The Institute for Economics and 
Peace argued that a country with high levels of corruption has less peace; in Venezuela, 
this argument has been illustrated by the rise of corruption, violence, and illicit activities 
during Chávez’s presidency. The U.S. State Department’s 2012 report on Venezuela’s 
Crime and Safety rated the criminal threat level for Caracas as critical.63 Factors that the 
reports mentioned were “a sense of criminal immunity, poorly paid and often corrupt 
police, inefficient politicized judiciary, a violent and overcrowded prison system, 
overworked prosecutors, and the presence of up to $25 million in illegal weapons in the 
country.”64 Reports from Transparencía Venezuela describe corrupt practices in prisons 
regarding family members seeing inmates.65 Family members bribe guards in order to 
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move forward in the queue for visitation.66 Leopoldo Colmenares explains that, because 
of Hugo Chávez’s revolutionary policies, there was “participation of high-level 
government officials and transnational criminal enterprises.”67 Some analysts used this 
development to frame Venezuela a threat to hemispheric security and a “mafia state” 
because of its “involvement of civilian and military figures of the government in 
activities linked to transnational organized crime.”68 This perceived threat demonstrates 
the impact of Venezuela’s corruption on peace, not just within the country, but also 
throughout the entire hemisphere. 
C. METHOD 
In order to answer the research questions, the analysis focuses specifically on 
corruption in Venezuela between 2000 and 2014. I use policy analysis from Chávismo 
and Cháveznomics to focus on two specific factors that facilitate the rise of corrupt 
practices in Venezuela: weak governance and Venezuela’s over-dependence on oil. 
Evaluation of weak governance is accomplished through scholarly literature within 
certain theoretical avenues, such as populism and neo-patrimonial systems, to determine 
how the strength of Venezuelan governance facilitated corrupt practices. Oil over-
dependence analyses, in conjunction with the economic theory of the Resource Curse, 
obtain from scholarly literature and non-profit organization’s reports, highlight how 
mismanagement of windfall rents and over-dependence on oil facilitated corruption 
within the state.  
For the second research question, the thesis evaluates scholarly literature 
regarding anti-corruption schools of thought. These anti-corruption theories, along with 
Venezuela’s corrupt environment, are scrutinized in order to determine the most 
appropriate anti-corruption solution that may aid the Venezuelan people. Research 
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reports from think tanks and scholarly literature evaluate specific anti-corruption methods 
against three societal characteristics: cultural context, political will, and international 
integration. Examples from Mexican and Brazilian anti-corruption policies strengthen the 
argument’s possible solutions.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review analyzes the current research regarding the factors that 
contribute to corruption in Venezuela and identifies the means to reverse the trend. For 
Venezuela, the literature argues that corruption under Chávez increased due to the radical 
changes of the political system and role of the military in social development. The 
literature identifies two arguments as factors that facilitate corruption. First, there is the 
argument that weak governance is a primary enabler of corruption.69 The second 
argument centers on problems from an abundance of oil described by the theory of the 
“Resource Curse,” which asserts that countries rich in a (non-renewable) resource can 
become economically stagnant because of mismanagement of the revenue. Anti-
corruption literature focuses on three considerations for effective creation and 
implementation strategies: cultural context, political will, and international integration.  
1. Venezuela Situation: Chávismo 
Few analyses of corruption occurred during the Chávez presidency. Gustavo 
Coronel is a former Board of Directors member of PDVSA and president of Agrupación 
Pro Calidad de Vida, where he served as the Venezuelan representative to Transparency 
International from 1996–2000.70 In his 2006 “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of 
Power in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela” policy paper, Coronel identifies that corruption in 
Venezuela, within the first eight years of the Chávez administration, increased because of 
“the windfall of oil revenues” and the “simultaneous reduction in transparency.”71 
Coronel identifies factors that led to the rise of corruption in Venezuela such as the 
“record oil income, mediocre management team, ideological predilections of Chávez, and 
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redistribution of oil income through direct handouts.”72 The author lists several examples 
of corrupt actions by Chávez and his government. The paper concludes with how 
Venezuela under Chávez has increased the motive, opportunity, and impunity of action 
due to the low income of bureaucrats who had recently been incorporated into the 
government, the lack of transparency and high bureaucratic turnover, and no punishment 
for those found to conduct corrupt practices.73  
International relations professors Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger’s 2004 
Volume Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization & Conflict, argues 
that the Fifth Republic or Chávismo replaced Punto Fijo because economic decline 
reenergized class conflict that Hugo Chávez exploited with polarized rhetoric of “haves 
and have-nots” but never capitalized on, ironically institutionalizing the “[aggregation] of 
class conflicts.”74 A key element to the argument involves Chávez’s vision of a more 
direct democracy. María Pilar García-Guadilla argued, in “Civil Society: 
Institutionalization Fragmentation, Autonomy,” that “the Bolivarian constitution 
attempted to institutionalize direct democracy, so that both forms of democracy 
(representative and participatory) would coexist and be underpinned by social 
organizations, more than by traditional political parties.”75 García-Guadilla’s chapter 
concludes that participatory government had the goal to “win legitimacy without losing 
power,” and “one of the risks was that social spaces would be opened up not to encourage 
new forms of participation by social groups but to facilitate manipulation.”76 Ellner and 
Hellinger argue that paternalism and clientelism in MVR leaders and the rank and file 
members were one of the factors that derailed Hugo Chávez’s attempts to create a more 
participatory democracy. 
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Latin Politics professors, George Philip and Francisco Panizza, in their 2011 
book, The Triumph of Politics: The Return of The Left in Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, argue that Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador created an alternative to the Miami 
Consensus in a radical populism with the twenty-first century Socialism political 
system.77 The authors define populism as “political strategy based on the discourse of 
popular unity and the stigmatization of unpopular elites,”78 and, with that definition, 
Venezuela’s radical populism’s key features include “populist rupture with the previous 
order, politics of antagonism, the centrality of charismatic leadership and the 
foundational drive to set up a new political and economic order.”79 Venezuela’s version 
of populism used “personalist leadership, plebiscitarian and grassroots forms of political 
participation and new forms of political organization rather than top-down populism, 
which is an unmediated relationship between leader and followers.”80 The authors also 
claim that organization is “not the same as accountability and civil society participation 
does not guarantee political autonomy from the state.” Examples such as a study of the 
allocation of social funds from social development, misiones, showed how with “given 
increased levels of electoral competition and weak institutional constraints, the 
government used these funds clientelistically, even while distributing oil income to the 
very poor” in actuality they, “[were] used to maintain support among Chavista voters at 
the local level.”81 In terms of corruption, Philip and Panizza claim “Chávismo…has been 
characterized by the colonization of the state by the ruling party and the systematic 
erosion of the checks and balances that characterized democratic pluralism.”82 
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2. Politicization of Military 
Chávez politicized the military through reforms that included their role in social 
development missions and their promotions system. Leopoldo E. Colmenares, an 
associate professor at Simón Bolívar University in Caracas, in his 2016 “Criminal 
Networks in Venezuela: Their Impact on Hemispheric Security” argues that Chávismo 
“has resulted in a state of affairs that allows a partnership between the Venezuelan 
government and illicit transnational organizations without radical changes in the social 
and political environment” creating a “mafia state.”83 Colmenares claims that several of 
the military members involved in development projects were “involved in scores of 
corruption cases and the misappropriation of immense quantities of allocated 
resources.”84 Chávez’s reform of the promotion system involved a loyalty system since 
promotions were approved by Hugo Chávez, creating a system that “a good number of 
those [officers] sought personal gain” replacing the meritocracy system previously in 
place. Colmenares concludes, “Ultimately, the environment of complete impunity and 
support provided by [Chávez] created a ‘criminal snowball’ effect within the group of 
Venezuelan public administration members and the military establishment.”85 
Moisés Naím, in his 2012 article “Mafia States,” argues that Venezuela is a mafia 
state. Naím shows evidence that Chávez top commander and Minister of Defense, 
General Henry Rangel Silva, in 2008 was “officially designated drug kingpin,” along 
with five other “high-ranking military officers.”86 Venezuela is also involved heavily in 
the cocaine business; with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime claims that 
Venezuela “supplies more than half of all cocaine shipments to Europe.”87 Other illicit 
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activity includes human trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, weapons 
smuggling, and the trade in contraband oil.88 
3. Cháveznomics 
In terms of economic models, Philip and Panizza also argue that Venezuela’s 
dependence on oil has worsened. They contend that, in the first five years of the his 
presidency, Chávez made few economic policy changes “until January 2005 [where] 
Chávez formally embraced socialism.”89 Philip and Panizza also claim that, faced with a 
“referendum to terminate his presidency, the government concentrated on social 
programmes aimed at the poorest sectors of society and their most urgent concerns for 
health and education”90 The focus on social development resulted in “no progress in 
developing non-oil exports and the destruction of the professional ethic with[in] PDVSA 
has made any kind of ‘Petrobras style’ of public-private cooperation unfeasible.” The 
authors conclude that Chávez failed to put Venezuela’s economy “on a viable footing.”91 
While Venezuela grew more dependent on exporting oil, the devastation of the 2002 coup 
and strikes on oil production showed that less and less oil was being exported, which 
exposed the “broader economic management” deficiencies.92 
Robert Looney argues in “Chavistanomics” that the Chávismo economic model 
negatively impacted Venezuela. Chávez pushed socialist programs to garner support from 
the poor through cash handouts, state control of industries in the country, and large social 
programs funded by their oil revenues.93 Some of the programs included job training for 
adults and handouts used to lessen the inequality gap.94 Looney claims that corruption 
increased more than in previous governments due to the patronage system among the 
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political elites or Chavistas and the self-governing communities and Chávez sympathizers 
as the leaders that obtained the funding for their areas.95 The article concludes that 
Chávez’s model is dependent on high oil revenue and predicted that many social 
programs could not be funded due to a decline in that revenue.96 Looney highlights that 
the population has grown dependent on government subsidies with no incentive to work 
out current situations and no savings for when oil price drops.97  
4. Factors that Facilitate Corruption: Weak Governance 
The Overseas Development Institute Team of the Department for International 
Development of the United Kingdom created a 2015 evidence paper about corruption. 
Alina Rocha Menocal et al. in the “Why corruption matters: Understanding Causes, 
Effects, and How to Address Them,” titled evidence paper identify weak governance in a 
country as “one of the fundamental causes of corruption.”98 Poor organization along 
these lines suggests that “systems corruption is a deadly sign that a society can no longer 
effectively manage its resources for public purposes.”99 Signs of weak governance are 
evident in weak institutions that have centralized power in a country’s executive along 
with weak accountability institutions. These policy choices have led to a powerful 
immunity for the elites and an opportunity for corruption.100 Menocal et al. call the 
centralized model of this kind of corruption neo-patrimonial systems.101 These systems 
have “weak separation of the public and private spheres, vertical and identity-based 
relationships having primacy over horizontal and rights-based relationships, and politics 
organized around ‘personalism’ or ‘big man’ syndrome, meaning a high centralization of 
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power and patron-client relations replicated throughout a society.”102 This neo-
patrimonial system creates an inherent weakness in institutions to fight against a strong 
executive base, which further limits accountability and shares the burden of providing 
political goods to a country.  
Menocal et al. also describe institutions’ political environments as a means for 
identifying power dynamics within a state, meaning that a state’s “functionality of 
institutions is shaped by the distribution of power in the political system and (dis) 
advantages such distribution confers.”103 Analysts claim the importance of understanding 
the “political settlement” or “political order,” which means, “a set of vested interest and 
power relations that establishes the rules of the game or access to the political and 
economic resource.”104 The major indicator of corruption is the method in which 
governments protect their power, in terms of “allocating rents and patronage” to maintain 
their power base.105 The strength of a centralized government manifests, in part, with its 
ability to maintain its power.  
Weak Governance also exposes a country to a specific political style, populism, 
that undermines democracy and furthers corruption within a state. Patricio Navia and 
Ignacio Walker, in their chapter in the 2008 Democratic Governance in Latin America, 
“Political Institutions, Populism, and Democracy in Latin America,” form an argument 
that “less well-consolidated democratic institutions promoted populist leaderships 
resulting in political and social policies conducive to either sustained development or to a 
reduction in poverty and inequality.”106 The analysts argue that populism is “the 
tendency of leaders, usually presidents, to reduce the number of veto actors in a political 
system.”107 Populism allows political outsiders to enter office under the sentiments of a 
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population frustrated with the political status quo. The population’s willingness to allow a 
centralization of control in “strong personalized leadership”108 is a sign of weak 
institutions. The context for the wave of populist leaders in Latin America is the 
consequence of deteriorating economies and claims of rampant systematic corruption in 
government.109 The argument concludes that several countries that opted for populist 
leadership saw a shift away from democratic governance, and now govern based on 
popular will with actions that weaken democratic institutions and blame corruption on the 
previous political system.110  
Latin American current affairs analyst Vladimir Torres, in his 2006 “The Impact 
of ‘Populism’ on Social, Political, and Economic Development in the Hemisphere,” 
furthers the argument on populism’s effects on weakening institutions by identifying a 
specific subset of populism, neo-populism. He defines neo-populism as an anti-system of 
the entire polity, which is a means to distinguish the 21st-century populist systems from 
the 20th-century leaders.111 The main factor of neo-populism is its fight against all 
elements of the previous political system, using severe polarization tactics for the 
population and replacing all “traditional democratic institutions” with central government 
control.112 Parallel structures are created to maintain neo-populist power through patron-
client and centralized means to discredit the opposition and engage the masses to vote in 
their favor.113 
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Analysts Daron Acemoglu et al., in “Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and 
Balances?” identify how weak governance and better-organized elites can create an 
environment that typical accountability mechanism such as checks and balances could 
facilitate corruption. Checks and Balances is a method to reduce politician rents 
(economic gain) and a means to control government through what James Madison 
referred to as “auxiliary precautions.”114 The idea of removing any accountability 
mechanisms appears counter-intuitive; however, Acemoglu et al. claim that, in countries 
with weak governance and better-organized rich elites, most voters would consciously 
choose to remove accountability mechanisms like checks and balances in order to remove 
the ease of organized rich elites to corrupt the executive.115 The result becomes that 
voters, mostly the poor ones in a society, remove checks and balances to concentrate 
rents to an executive with the expectation that wealth would be redistributed to the 
poor.116 The goal with this approach is for presidents to achieve the “political bliss 
point.”117 The political bliss point is when the system allows presidents to redistribute 
funds to the poor, while they capture rents for themselves, making the rich elite powerless 
against the president.118 The fear of these weak polities is a government with well-
organized rich elites able to conduct corrupt actions, such as bribery and lobbying, to 
influence politicians.119 As a result, elites would concentrate all the wealth among 
themselves. Poor voters tend to believe it would be more beneficial to remove the 
accountability mechanisms to protect the president from rich elites’ influence. The risk of 
removing checks and balances “may have a more difficult time making the credible 
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commitment to citizens [and] that their assets will be safe from expropriation after they 
have exerted effort to accumulate them.”120  
Weak governance not only facilitates corruption in the highest levels of 
governance; it is also affects institutions that promote peace. The Institute of Economics 
and Peace’s (IEP) 2015 Peace and Corruption report argues that there is a correlation 
between peace and corruption, claiming that “corruption is an instrumental factor in 
decreasing peacefulness and increasing levels of violence in societies.”121 Institutions, 
like the police and the judiciary, are major elements in the peace-corruption dynamic, 
showing that lowering corruption in those institutions can see an increase of peacefulness 
in societies.122 The potential for corruption in these institutions seem the highest due to 
the inability of the government to adequately fund, man, and hold these institutions 
accountable.123 The result becomes a high level of inefficiency and impunity that occurs 
while the rise in violence escalates.124  
5. Resource Curse 
Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, in 2008 “Combating the Resource 
Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth,” describe the effects of a 
natural resource on a state through the theory of the Resource Curse. Weinthal and Luong 
explain how natural rents foster corruption, using models that connect rents to corruption 
in an environment without product market competition. The implications of the studies 
                                                 
120 Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack, “Boondoggles, Rent-Seeking, and Political Checks and 
Balances: Public Investment under Unaccountable Governments,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 
89, no. 3 (August 2007): 567. 
121 “Peace and Corruption 2015: Lowering Corruption A Transformative Factor for Peace,” Peace and 
Corruption (New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, May 2015), 3, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Peace%20and%20Corruption.pdf  
122 Ibid., 3. 
123 United States Department of State, “Venezuela 2012 Crime and Safety Report,” OSAC, September 
30, 2012, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13038. 
124 “Peace and Corruption 2015,” 4. 
 22 
illustrate that, without foreign competition, the higher the rents (revenue), the higher the 
corruption levels.125  
Professor Erwin Bulte and World Bank economist Richard Damania, in their 2008 
article, “Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy, and the Natural Resource Curse,” 
argue that, in terms of democracy, the lack of competition, political or economic, as well 
as the “potential costs of political transitions…are key elements in generating the 
Resource Curse.”126 The results of this model make clear distinctions between 
democracy and autocracy, which are political participation and executive recruitment 
competition, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. 
Bulte and Damania suggest that it is possible for “an incumbent politician who receives 
all resource rents and who might distort the allocation of labor between the private and 
public sector generate political support and retain office.”127 The blending of both sectors 
eliminates the opportunity for opposition and ensures support from a key group in 
society, the business sector. Also, countries become vulnerable to “Dutch Disease,” or a 
“rapid increase in the exchange rate [that] weakens domestic production in other sectors 
because it becomes cheaper to import goods rather than produce them domestically, 
while goods produced for export become more expensive in foreign markets.”128  
In a 2011 article, “The Resource Curse and Oil Revenue in Angola and 
Venezuela,” a sociology professor, John Hammond, argues that countries are able to 
combat the Resource Curse by political changes. Hammond claims that political controls 
can affect the trajectory that the Resource Curse tends to generate, however; other 
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analysts take it a step further, stating that an opening of competition can lead to “a 
perpetuation of the Resource Curse in a different form,” while others argue that foreign 
investment is a solution to the curse.129 Hammond cites analysts who claim that 
centralized control of natural resource production “[precludes] corruption in the 
assignment of contracts to international oil companies”130 The argument concludes that 
redistribution of wealth, regardless of strength of government institutions, provides 
enough of a relief to the Resource Curse effects.131  
6. Societal Elements: Cultural Context 
Gene Hofstede’s “Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) Project National Cultural Dimensions of Values and Practices” are used as a 
main tool for scholars to breakdown the elements of a country’s culture for the purposes 
of corruption. Analysts use these dimensions as a means to understand what enables 
corruption and how to create effective anti-corruption mechanisms. For example, Bryan 
Husted, in his 2002 article, “Culture and International Anti-Corruption Agreements in 
Latin America,” argues that effective anti-corruption methods, especially international 
conventions against corruption, need to be created within a specific cultural context 
instead of a “one-size fits all” approach.132 The cultural consideration argument identifies 
four core cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance, and masculinity-femininity.133 Within these four dimensions, the article 
concludes that international conventions need to “work at a level of group norms, with a 
strong executive leadership, very clear and unambiguous rules that seek to harness 
individual and group interests to promote fighting corruption and [incorporating] shame 
for social control.”134  
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Ahmed Seleim and Nick Bontis, in their 2009 article, “The Relationship between 
Culture and Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” also cites Gene Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions in evaluating corruption within countries. The research cites nine dimensions: 
performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance, power 
distance, institutional collectivism, individual collectivism, gender differentiation, and 
human orientation. To fight corruption, their framework of cultural determinants is based 
on establishing an understanding of a country’s “societal culture and deeper analysis of 
its underlying causes and infrastructures.”135 Policy-makers can combat corruption 
through stronger reforms that focus on the “dominant national culture in more corrupted 
countries.”136  
Finally, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were used to analyze corruption through a 
sociological lens. Sociologists Seymour Lipset and Gabriel Lenz argue two sociological 
models that incorporate Hofstede’s cultural dimensions: “means-ends schema” and 
“familism.”137 Means-ends schema deals with various accounts of ethical gaffes and 
familism draws emphasis on family orientation.138 The models incorporate cultural 
elements to explain and possibly predict corruption in a country. 
Menocal et al.’s “Why corruption matters” evidence paper also identifies cultural 
context consideration in relation to a popular anti-corruption method called national anti-
corruption strategies (NACS). There is little literature appraising their effectiveness 
because of the difficulty in evaluating NACSs.139 Most of the NACSs have been 
documented as failures due to their reliance on one-size-fits-all plans more than 
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individualized reform methods.140 Also, if a plan does not include institutional reforms to 
strengthen the key institutions that NACSs rely on, such as judicial and police 
institutions, there is little probability of success.141  
7. Political Will 
Derick W. Brinkerhoff’s 2000 “Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption 
Efforts: An Analytic Framework,” specifies “characteristics of political will, set of 
environmental factors that influence political will, and the connections among them.”142 
Factors, such as the will of elites to empower anti-corruption methods, the understanding 
of the factors that facilitate or exacerbate corruption, and the degree to which a society is 
willing and able to mobilize are combined with environmental factors, such as regime 
type or civil society. From the findings, Brinkerhoff created two methods of 
strengthening political will via direct or indirect influences, which affect both the 
characteristics of political will and the environment.143 The argument concludes that 
collective action types of anti-corruption methods need political will to be effective.144 
Menocal et al.’s “Why Corruption Matters” evidence paper also identifies 
political will as a critical element that should be considered in organizing and 
participating in civil society organizations.145 The paper proceeds to counter civil 
organizations by stating that “demand-led or civil society-led approaches are rarely 
capable in societies with weak institutions or institutions incapable of providing adequate 
accountability mechanisms.”146 The paper identifies a need to strengthen the link 
between civil society and the state by ensuring downward accountability through 
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strengthening public institutions instead of using demand-led approaches.147 The 
argument concludes that public support or demand for anti-corruption methods is not 
enough for success, regardless of the powerful role the public has on the state’s elite.148  
8. International Integration 
Wayne Sandholtz and Mark M. Gray’s 2003 “International Integration and 
National Corruption” argues how international input of economic and normative factors 
can have both international and domestic implications, claiming that domestically 
“international transactions increase the costs of corrupt acts or decrease their payoffs” 
while internationally, “international norms can shape the social standards and create a 
demand for condemnation of corruption.”149 Normative factors are necessary and 
somewhat overlooked in the analysis of corruption and corrupt actors’ choices.150 Other 
factors involve the relationship between corruption and international trade because the 
consequences of corrupt practices affects companies through lower returns, profits, and 
possible survivability in the market.151 Also these “bribe-paying companies suffer under 
international competition, having less money to offer and receive less corruption-related 
income.”152  
9. Summary 
The literature identified several arguments regarding the factors that influence 
corruption and considerations for building anti-corruption methods. The main factors that 
facilitate Venezuela’s corruption are weak governance and the abundance of oil. While 
there are other known factors that facilitate corruption, the weak governance and 
abundance of oil, better correspond with corruption in Venezuela, hence the reason for 
the limited scope.  
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Anti-corruption literature gauged three considerations that evaluate effective anti-
corruption measures. Analysts argue that the considerations of cultural context, political 
will, and international integration are required when prescribing and creating anti-
corruption methods. A major debate remains regarding the validity of anti-corruption 
analysis, because of the difficulty of measuring corruption. Though this is a known 
limitation of the analysis, the literature concludes that corruption is a complex and multi-
faceted problem.153 The considerations can still serve as a baseline to understand how 
corruption can appear within a society and determine the efficiency of anti-corruption 
methods.  
Corruption affects large sectors of a country from economic growth and 
development to disproportionate effects on the vulnerable and poor parts of a society.154 
While some literature argues that corruption can assist transitioning governments 
overcome institutional shortcomings, facilitate trade and investment, and aid in conflict 
resolution, there is a serious cost where corruption “[maintains] peace/stability …at the 
price of development and [maintaining] weak/authoritarian regimes.”155 In the case of 
Venezuela, while there are arguments that corruption can provide some peace/stability, 
the cost of that stability is maintaining mediocre policies, as is shown with Hugo 
Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Counter arguments exist as to the severity of corruption in Venezuela. Gregory 
Wilpert is a Chavista and founder of the left-leaning, Pro-Bolivarian Revolution news 
website venezuelanalysis.com. He argues against the accusations of Chávez’s Venezuela 
being the most corrupt country in Latin America according to the 2006 Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index.156 Wilpert argues that Transparency 
International is a biased source of data, “given that the perceptions of Venezuela are to a 
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large extent shaped by the international and national media, which overwhelmingly 
sympathize with the opposition in Venezuela and constantly accuse the Chávez 
government of corruption.”157 Wilpert also argues how other indices show Venezuela in a 
better ranking like Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer and 
Latinobarómetro since they survey “nationals of the countries in question,” versus the 
Corruption Perception Index that questions “non-national and non-resident experts and 
business people.”158 Wilpert concludes that more objective data needs to be analyzed 
before “blanket statements of ‘rampant corruption’ in Venezuela under Chávez” is used.159  
Despite the claim of Wilpert on the use of Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, Fredrik Galtung and Jeremy Pope argue that it is a “poll of 
polls” that “combines several measures of political corruption for each country.”160 
Countries use the index to judge their government’s health in terms of corruption and 
acknowledge the influence that the index has. Countries have accomplished efforts to 
improve their scores, like in Malaysia where they created an anti-corruption campaign to 
mobilize against corruption, placing both power and money behind the campaign.161 The 
authors illustrate that the result was a new focal point and a national chapter, TI-Malaysia 
to “push to enhance the country’s integrity.”162 They acknowledge a limitation of the 
index in that it “does not capture the absolute amount of corruption in any one country, 
nor does it go much into detail.”163 Regardless of the limitation, the authors say, 
“Transparency International has been part of, and in many instances in the lead of, a 
move to internationalize the efforts to curb corruption.”164 The Corruption Perception 
                                                 
157 Wilpert, “Corruption in Venezuela.” 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Fredrik Galtung and Jeremy Pope, “The Global Coalition Against Corruption: Evaluating 
Transparency International,” in The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, 
ed. Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1999), 275. 
161 Ibid., 276. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid.  
 29 
Index gives a snapshot of where corruption has gone in Venezuela over Chávez’s 
presidency and also how it compares in the region, a unique quality for the index.165 
Nevertheless, corruption is a deteriorating element for Venezuela, and this thesis breaks 
down the elements that Chávez introduced that led to the sharp rise and also attempts to 
incorporate a more robust, sustainable anti-corruption mechanism to curb its rise. 
This thesis argues that the reason corruption rose during Hugo Chávez’s 
presidency is because of the implementation of Chávismo along with the windfalls of oil 
revenue that facilitated a system that eliminated accountability and transparency 
mechanisms while also mismanaging funds under impunity. It also argues that an 
international anti-corruption institution could be created within Venezuela that considers 
the country’s cultural context while incorporating political will and international 
integration elements to ensure survivability and functionality. Chapters II and III analyze 
the situation in Venezuela through two lenses shown to facilitate corruption: weak 
governance and abundance of oil. The research argues how Chávismo’s economic and 
political policies exacerbated opportunities for corruption within the state. Chapter IV 
explains anti-corruption theory and scrutinizes Venezuela’s corruption situation with 
three societal considerations: cultural context, political will, and international integration, 
to determine a suitable anti-corruption model. Chapter V proposes an anti-corruption 
strategy that analyzes examples from Mexico and Brazil to shape the potential strategy 
for Venezuela. 
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II. VENEZUELA’S WEAK GOVERNANCE 
Corruption attacks the stability of countries’ political systems and therefore 
distresses an entire population, leaving behind broken trust among citizens. Multiple 
factors create breeding grounds for corruption within a polity. Weak governance, for 
example, is understood as “one of the fundamental leading causes of corruption.”166 
Weak governance includes weak political systems that fuel corruption. Neo-Patrimonial 
and Populist systems further intensify issues, like corruption, present in a country. How 
did weak governance influence the rise of corruption within Venezuela? Venezuela’s 
legacy of weak governance under their pluralist two-party system, Punto Fijo, was 
replaced with a populist style of socialism that proved to be an even greater detriment. 
Chapter II defines weak governance, examines its typical manifestations, and analyzes 
how populism and neo-patrimonial systems, particularly, intensify Venezuela’s breeding 
grounds for corruption. The chapter analyzes how Chávez’s model of governance 
resulted in political, economic, and social changes facilitating the rise in corruption 
during his 14 -year presidencies and beyond. Hugo Chávez’s political system, Chávismo, 
incorporated both neo-patrimonial and populist principles that resulted in an increase in 
corruption due to reforms that created a weak governance while removing key democratic 
institutions that can curb corruption. To examine weak governance, the thesis first 
examines strong governance. 
A. STRONG GOVERNANCE 
It is necessary to examine what governance means to better understand the 
differences between strong and weak governance and how they connect to corruption. 
Daniel Kaufmann et.al defines governance as “traditions and institutions by which 
authority in the country is exercised,”167 and the World Bank defines governance as “the 
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rules of the rulers typically within a given set of rules.”168 The two definitions claim that 
individuals are bounded by rules that assist a country to govern citizens. The World Bank 
(The Bank) says that “understanding governance requires an identification of both the 
rulers and the rules, as well as the various processes by which they are selected, defined, 
and linked together with the society generally.”169 Francis Fukuyama claims that 
governance falls into three different meanings: “international governance or international 
cooperation through non-sovereign bodies outside state system, governance as public 
administration or good governance, and governance without government or governance 
as the regulation of social behavior through networks and other nonhierarchical 
mechanisms.”170 In this thesis, governance is “a synonym (or euphemism) for traditional 
public administration, that is, the implementation of policies…by old-fashioned 
governments.”171 Governance’s definition has strong ties to the move in the 1990s for 
neoliberal policies known as the Washington Consensus, like privatization and 
deregulation, which claim that governances are “obstacles to robust economic 
growth.”172 Fukuyama’s definition allows for an understanding of governance as an 
important element for market exchange with The Bank focusing “emphasis on the 
effective provision of basic public goods and services.”173 Institutions began to focus on 
factors, like corruption, as barriers to economic growth instead of governance themselves. 
Strong governance, often referred to as good governance, obviously means 
different things to different institutions and at different times. Fukuyama states that there 
are literatures that acknowledge “considerable ambiguity as to [governance’s] exact 
meaning.”174 He goes on to say that the “focus on governance as implementation, that is, 
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the state’s capacity to provide basic public goods and services.”175 What is clear is the 
importance of identifying the quality of governance. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan noted, “Strong governance is perhaps the single most important factor in 
eradicating poverty and promoting development.”176 There are variations with 
governance’s definitions with several institutions constructing means to measure strong 
governance. Fukuyama identifies The Bank having taken the lead in evaluating 
governance, with the following criteria: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption.177 Others, like Fredrick Galtung and Jeremy Pope, identify the 
following factors: public sector management, accountability, the legal framework for 
development, and information and transparency as necessary elements for strong 
governance.178 These evaluation mechanisms allow agencies to analyze and determine 
strength of governments based on institutional capacity and availability.  
Despite the difficulty of identifying a definitive definition of governance and 
strong governance there are recognized examples. According to Ron Exiner in the Good 
Governance Guide, there are seven characteristics of strong governance: accountable, 
transparent, follows rule of law, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and 
efficient, and participatory.179 What does that mean for countries to have these features? 
According to Kaufmann et al., “[Strong] governance requires time and resources to 
develop, suggesting that richer countries are more likely to enjoy [strong] 
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governance…[depending] on a country’s political and social history.”180 Kaufmann et 
al., also go on to describe a causal relationship between improved governance to better 
development outcomes, as a key driver for wanting to measure governance in states. The 
report specifically identify per capita growth having a major payoff to improvements in 
government with similar findings in infant mortality and adult literacy.181 As a result, 
strong governance matters in terms of the ability of countries to develop and provide 
goods for their societies. The World Bank also identifies the difficulty in providing 
specific reforms to achieve strong governance specifically with accountability, “increased 
government accountability to citizens should improve performance but does not 
necessary translate into specific reforms in accountability” and “micro-level interventions 
(e.g., parent associations in schools or public expenditure tracking surveys) is more 
compelling, but is usually insufficient to demonstrate whether good results would persist 
when interventions are scaled up or brought to less favorable governance 
environments.”182 Regardless of the inconclusive nature of specific reforms to improve 
governance, there is a focus on “public sector management, particularly financial 
management…increase information, community-driven development, decentralization, 
and support to civil society.”183 Since governance is seen as an essential component to 
economic success, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are promoting reforms that 
are more socially inclusive in the responsibility of improved governance. The need to 
measure and provide assistance to governances in order to improve their strength is vital 
in lessening discrepancies like corruption.  
Weak governance signifies a lack of what governances need to rule a territory or 
citizens effectively, to include, for example, providing public goods or being held 
accountable through rule of law as a means to protect the state. Weak or poor 
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governance, according to the World Bank, is strongly correlated with “deficiencies in 
development” or “corruption, distortion of government budgets, inequitable growth, 
social exclusion, [and] lack of trust in authorities.”184 According to Daniel Kauffman et 
al. weak governance manifests “in the form of ineffective rule of law, inadequate 
protection of property rights, widespread corruption, and ill-advised policymakers 
serving special interests.”185 As a result, the state is unable to protect citizens. According 
to Chilufya Kawelwa, weak governance has an “absence of participation, consensus 
orientation…freedom of speech, expression, association, transparency, accountability, 
and no place for rule of law or respect for human rights.”186 Also, weak governance 
makes states unable to provide public goods such as health care and education.187 Since 
the institutions are deficient on providing public goods or following rule of law, there are 
known correlations between corruption and weak governances. 
Institutions’ (or bodies of rules that make up governance) weaknesses can lead to 
rules that leave portions of the population disadvantaged and create a hotbed for 
corruption. Corruption is seen as a sign of weak governance. Examples of corruption in 
weak governance is what Susan Rose-Ackerman describes as, “Private individuals and 
business firms pay to get routine services, get to the head of the bureaucratic queue, limit 
their taxes, avoid costly regulations, obtain contracts at inflated prices, and get 
concessions and privatized firms at low prices.”188 Also, in terms of public officials, they 
may “redesign programs and propose public projects with few public benefits and many 
opportunities for private profit.”189 It creates strong distrust among citizens in a 
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government’s ability to provide political strength, which creates opportunities for other 
influences to fill the void. According to Alina Rocha Menocal et al., “the political and 
economic opportunities available in different political systems, as well as the strength and 
effectiveness of state, social, and economic institutions, shape the conditions in which 
corruption can thrive.”190 Institution inefficiencies can create mechanisms for informal 
institutions to undermine the power of formal (state) institutions through corrupt 
practices. Thus, the lack of the state to provide public goods can lead to other informal 
institutions filling the void with corrupt procedures to accomplish what the formal 
institutions are unable to deliver. 
Certain informal institutions that are introduced to fill the gaps, providing what 
weak formal institutions cannot, opens the door for corruption. Gretchen Helmke and 
Steven Levitsky describe two types of informal institutions that can harm the state and 
institutionalize corrupt practices, such as clientelist procedures. Divergent informal 
institutions attempt to undermine state’s institutions by competing with formal 
institutions through undermining their legitimacy and effectiveness, as well as convergent 
informal institutions, which substitute formal institutions that may not exist.191 Both 
forms of informal institutions use clientelist procedures to ensure their survivability or 
provide strength to disenfranchised or excluded citizens from the traditional political 
system.192 These informal institutions can be seen in places where the state is unable to 
penetrate, for example, in Brazil’s poorer state of Piauí, which participate in clientelist 
procedures to ensure support through vote buying versus richer states, like São Paulo, 
which use a programmatic approach that pushes the policies to make citizens happy and 
challenges governors’ power.193 The programmatic process allows legislators to 
undermine the governors’ ability to use clientelist processes to keep their power while in 
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poor states the clientelist networks allow governors to buy off support without having to 
push forward policies that could undercut their power. Informal institutions have shown 
some assistance in weak governances to provide more for their citizens, as is the case in 
indigenous communities that governments decide to allow informal (non-state sanction) 
institutions to exist; however, corruption can become institutionalized in most informal 
institutions and result in citizens losing trust in the state to provide services.  
The lack of accountability, as mention previously, is a major factor identified as a 
deficiency in weak governances and expand the ability of corruption to permeate all 
aspects of society. Accountability is recognized as essential for strong governance 
because it requires state officials and citizens to follow the rule of law and protect from 
abuses from those in power for private gain (corruption). According to Daniel Lederman 
et al., there is a link between political accountability and strong governance, where 
“accountability allows for the punishment of politicians that adopt ‘bad policies’ thus 
aligning politicians’ preferences with those of their citizens.”194 In strong governances, 
accountability institutions should handle various aspects of liability. According to 
Kawelwa, “accountability needs transparency and rule of law…governments and 
institutions to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.”195 Weak 
governances either have deficiencies in their accountability institutions or an absence of it 
all together, which allows for too much discretion for actors.196 The accountability 
mechanisms come in several forms and can be eliminated from governances through 
citizen referendums or leadership maneuvering.  
Checks and balances is an accountability mechanism that is meant to lower the 
possibilities of corruption to occur; however, these accountability mechanisms can be 
removed by the behest of citizens. Lederman et al. claim check and balances along with 
separation of power can help “prevent abuses of authority, with different government 
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bodies disciplining each other in the citizens’ favor.”197 Citizens, however, that recognize 
the inherent weakness in the government could choose to eliminate accountability 
mechanisms in order to lessen the means of corrupt actions. Some of the checks and 
balances mechanisms that are removed include separation of powers in government 
branches and decree powers given to the executive or president that undermines 
legislature’s ability to provide checks on the president. If the power of rich elites within 
weak governance is strong than it can pose a greater threat to the most vulnerable parts of 
society than the removal of checks and balances for the executive. Concurring with 
Acemoglu et al., corruption by the rich elites through non-electoral means (bribes) is such 
a substantial risk to the poorest members of society that to vote to dismantle checks and 
balances allows for the president to effectively redistribute wealth at the acceptance of a 
“certain amount of unfavorable politician rent or politician’s pet policies.”198 Acemoglu 
et al. explain through the case of Venezuela, “the fact that Chávez acts as the ‘owner’ of 
Venezuela and engages in foreign policy that does little for most Venezuelans 
corresponds to a form of (significant) rents conceded by voters to Chávez in order to get 
the policies they want in other dimensions.”199 The policies voters seek are more social 
development programs that improve their lots in life. Thus, the removal of checks and 
balances is the best situation for these weak governances’ poorest segments of society, 
who is the most interested in limiting the power of rich elites in a state and gain political 
goods for their neglected segments of society.  
B. NEO-PATRIMONIAL SYSTEMS 
Neo-patrimonial systems, along with the removal of certain democratic 
institutions and accountability mechanisms, can further exacerbate corruption. A neo-
patrimonial system blends both patrimonialism and legal-rational domination where 
office-holders use their positions or public funds to build personal relationships in order 
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to maintain their power.200 Menocal et al. define, “neo-patrimonial systems as a private 
appropriation of public resources, centralization of power to a leader who practices 
‘personalism or big man syndrome’ to maintain or create those patron-client relations, 
and where vertical and identity-based relationships have primacy.”201 Neo-patrimonial 
systems incorporate corruption into their practices to ensure access to power. According 
to Christian Von Soest, “corruption is another symptom of neo-patrimonialism,” that 
takes place at the “interaction between state and non-state actors.”202 He goes on to claim 
that it weakens institutional safeguards against corruption and that weak, formal 
institutions make it a “high profit, low risk activity.”203 As a result, the accountability 
mechanisms are inefficient in keeping the cost to participate in corruption lower than the 
threat of retribution.  
Accountability mechanisms are typically weak in neo-patrimonial networks, in 
order to ensure impunity for the leader to conduct corrupt actions to gain power. The 
accountability mechanisms that neo-patrimonial networks relay on are typically elections 
and informal practices.204 Farzana Nawaz explains that the use of elections is not an 
effective accountability mechanism due to the “concentration of power in the hands of 
wealthy and/or powerful politicians and weaken political opposition” that will therefore, 
“limit voter choices at election time.” Elections become manipulated and force the 
continuation of the neo-patrimonial system. Another accountability mechanism, informal 
measures, allows for the state to apply pressure on citizens to support the system through 
“personal relationships and notions of [honor] and loyalty.”205 The use of patronage, 
thus, gives elites the ability to ensure their power through a support-buying system. For 
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example, Clark Gibson and Barak Hoffman argue that leaders will use “tactics such as 
providing food subsidies to the urban areas to pacify the population and ensure their grip 
on power,” the leader will than “sacrifice short-term political gains for long-term 
development and growth strategy,” that will eventually “hurt the availability and 
consequently [the] access to resources in the long run.”206 The main goal is power and 
limited sacrifices from the leader. The goal in neo-patrimonial systems is to maintain 
power through a dependency network that entices people to keep the leader in office. A 
stronger appearance of improvement in their social situations, the more likely the support 
(votes) will remain and the more power the leader is able to secure. 
C. POPULISM 
Weak governance can also manifest in a populist political style that fosters 
mechanisms to sustain governance’s weak stance and facilitate corruption. Populism has 
several definitions; however, for this thesis, it is defined as a style of government that 
focuses on a charismatic leader who represents the rights of the disenfranchised masses 
through divisive means, typically against the status quo of the political system.207 
Vladimir Torres notes, “populism is more a style of doing politics than an ideology.”208 
According to Patricio Navia and Ignacio Walker, “populism has been identified with the 
weakness of democracy, either as a cause or consequence of it [governance’s] 
weakening.”209 Populist leaders tend to arise from the fringes of the political system, as 
an alternative to the inefficient status quo. Torres notes that typically “populism arises in 
the context of political crisis, when the legitimacy of institutions is questioned, and the 
status quo of the political system seems incapable of responding to the populations’ 
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demands.”210 Legitimacies are questioned in times of extreme crisis in a state and large 
deficiencies are identified, like corrupt practices.  
Weak governances allow for the promotion of populist leaders, who take 
advantage of the downturn of the country through polarized rhetoric toward the political 
status quo, as the culprit of the lack of progress or corruption. A populist leader begins to 
blame the incumbent political system as the root cause of the major crisis and relates any 
institution and former method of governance as an instrument to their corruption and 
inefficiencies. For example, Hugo Chávez’s strong rhetoric against the former Punto Fijo 
elites appealed to the Venezuelan poor, fueled an intense polarization among classes, 
which translated into an “edifice of power through a succession of elections including…a 
new constitution.”211 The new constitution concentrated power at Chávez to include 
reforms such as, “consecutive reelection for the president and [setting] up an electoral 
council that is a fourth branch of government.”212 Chávez’s rhetoric was used to garner 
the support necessary to enact policies, even when it did not necessarily provide benefits 
to his constituents, because of his appealing claim that these policies will remove the ills 
introduced by the corrupt elites of the former Punto Fijo system. Navia and Walker claim 
that populist systems, “[result] in political and social policies [not] conducive to either 
sustained development or to a reduction in poverty and inequality.”213 Once in power, 
these leaders are forced to create networks that circumvent institutions by more direct 
participation, since many are on the outside of the traditional political system, including 
political parties.  
Populist leaders typically have no political party mechanism to garner votes or 
support, which force the need to create a more grassroots initiative among the population 
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in order to collect the votes. Examples of this direct participation include, a president 
centralizing power onto them, holding referendums to create new laws that avoid an 
obstruction from the opposition, or forcing compromise from political elites to push 
forward the president’s agendas. For example, Hugo Chávez was noted as a pioneer of 
public will and showed, “little desire to build a coherent party, relying instead on the 
heterogeneous political grouping he calls the Fifth Republic Movement,” which included 
the Armed Forces and citizen power through government-sponsored neighborhood, 
“Bolivarian Circles.”214 Furthermore, “once in power, the direct connection that populist 
leaders claim to have with the people translates into bypassing institutional mechanisms, 
and direct-clientelism prevail[ing] in the state-citizen relationship.”215 This can be seen 
through populist leaders acquiring support through “vote buying” or exchanging goods 
and services for support at the polls, similar to the neo-patrimonial systems. Corruption, 
as their main vehicles for acceptance, in the populist political system is not removed. The 
clientelism networks that populist leaders create replaces the incumbent corrupt political 
systems, which results in corruption intensifying, because it has replace the traditional 
role of political parties with clientelist procedures to collect votes and support from its 
power base. 
The populist style uses the democratic system of elections to further legitimize its 
position domestically and internationally while institutionalizing corruption. Thus, 
“populism becomes a viable ‘political regime.’”216 Corrupt practices become necessary 
and institutionalized for populist leaders to gain support, with the appearance that the 
public is condoning the action through their vote. Populist leaders use democratic 
practices to distance its regimes from authoritarian systems, because it is able to claim 
that the people had a choice. The difference between the democratic practices of populist 
systems versus non-populist systems is the suppression of opposition voices. Torres 
claims that it provides justification for “the suppression of civil society’s independent 
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organizations.”217 The removal of democratic institutions, like political parties, exposes a 
country to hidden corruption within democratic practices to claim an appearance of 
legitimacy. Next, the chapter describes how weak governance manifests in Venezuela 
throughout its transition to democracy until the application of Chávismo. 
D. PUNTO FIJO 1958–1998 
Corruption persisted throughout Venezuela’s experiment of democracy, not just 
from the introduction of the Bolivarian Revolution in 1998. John Chasteen illustrates that 
in Latin America, “patronage politics made corruption…a necessary part of the [political] 
system.”218 Venezuela’s experiment of democracy began in 1958 with the overthrow of 
the corrupt dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez and employment of free elections. The 
initiation of democracy dealt with issues of power distribution with political parties and 
other institutions vying for power. According to Terry Lynn Karl, the political party, 
Acción Democrática (AD), was the first party to lead, with party founder Rómulo 
Betancourt, and as a result had the strongest power position entering into the negotiations 
for Punto Fijo.219 There were other political actors, like the military, Catholic Church, 
and other political parties like Comité de Organización Electoral Independiente (COPEI), 
which also vied for power and desired to curb the AD while gaining their own positions. 
The goal of players, ultimately, was to limit the power of the AD from complete 
radicalization of the democratic system. 
Pacto de Punto Fijo incorporated Venezuela’s influential political players into an 
agreement for all players to secure spoils of the state and preserve democracy. Prior to the 
first ever-Venezuelan elections in 1958, all political parties running signed the Pacto de 
Punto Fijo, binding all the presidential candidates to the “same basic political and 
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economic program, regardless of the electoral outcome.”220 Key provisions of the pact 
were intended for other political players, not just the political parties. For example, the 
military was to become “apolitical, obedient, and non-deliberative” in exchange for 
modernization of equipment, improvement of economic situation, and maintenance of 
obligatory military service.221 Also, the Church received new legal status and higher 
subsidies from all political parties.222 The Political parties, AD and COPEI, gained a 
political truce that involved depersonalization of debates, consultation among parties, 
formation of coalitions, and equitable distribution of state spoils.223 Many organizations, 
therefore, benefited while citizens only had more to lose. Karl identifies that the pact was 
“a classic exchange between ‘the right to rule for the right to make money.’”224 The 
distribution of spoils manifested into “state jobs and contracts, partitioning of the 
ministries, and a complicated spoils systems the ensured political party survivability.”225 
The agreement provided benefits for all the players involved in the creation of the pact; 
however, it exposed the state to spreading corruption farther than the military 
dictatorships of the past had within their inner circles. 
Corruption allegations surrounded Punto Fijo, which ultimately jeopardized 
democratic legitimacy and laid the foundations for Hugo Chávez. The pact created a 
system of sharing oil wealth among party members that lent to more stability to 
Venezuela than other Latin American countries but at a hefty price: corruption and a 
dependence on oil revenues. Leslie Gates claims that political corruption was necessary 
to secure democracy because it “generat[ed] the large middle-class of consumers, which 
in turn, helped support a growing industrial sector.”226 Gates goes on to claim that 
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corruption “was viewed as an important means of stabilizing the two multi-class parties” 
rather than a tool of subjugation of the poor.227 Venezuela’s political transition to 
democracy saw corruption as the necessary means to balance power among feuding elites 
through a clientelist network of power sharing between AD and COPEI; however, the 
system could not be continual. According to Jennifer McCoy, “state subsidies gave 
everyone a bit of the wealth, but income distribution remained inequitable and the parties 
gradually took control of most organizations within civil society.”228 The argument lends 
itself to the idea that power could not simply remain at the political parties’ elites, despite 
their attempts to keep it concentrated at their positions. McCoy claims that the inability of 
Punto Fijo to expand their inner circle and adjust to societal changes led to the growing 
“perception that the two major parties who alternated in power throughout Venezuela’s 
democratic history were becoming increasingly centralized, corrupt, and out of touch 
with the needs of the general population.”229 The corruption that was once seen as 
necessary to temper party competition has shown to tip the balance of power too much to 
the political party elites at the detriment of the neglected rest of society. In the 1970s, 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez was identified as one of the “wealthiest Latin Americans,” 
which began suspicion as to where his money was coming from.230 The image of Pérez 
and other members of Punto Fijo as corrupt opened up the political arena for alternative 
political systems. 
The populace’s view of politicians as corrupt combined with the neoliberal 
measures enacted to resuscitate the economy created an environment of civil unrest and 
demands for change. A failed coup attempt in 1992 to oust President Pérez led to a 
political alternative challenging the current system. Thus, Hugo Chávez, the coup 
organizer, became a hero to the people. The coup organizers were military members from 
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a group called the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (MBR 200), whose goal was 
to regain “patriotic values, dignify the military career, and fight against corruption.”231 
At the time of the coup, the Caracazo riots occurred over austerity measures that 
included cuts to “populist and clientelist government programs”232 as well as massive 
cuts to the military’s pay and benefits.233 President Pérez decided to use the military to 
subdue protests, leading to 400 dead.234 A member of the MBR 200, Lieutenant Colonel 
Jesus Urdaneta (ret.), claimed that, from that moment (Caracazo), the only viable means 
to initiate change in the country was force.235 The MBR 200 seized the moment on 
February 3, 1992, to accomplish their aspirations with a coup d’état throughout 
Venezuela. The key locations hit were the presidential residence “La Casona,” 
Miraflores place, Generalísimo Francisco Miranda air base, military headquarters at 
Fuerte Tiuna army barracks, along with four major cities’ government and economic 
installations.236 Despite their successful objectives at obtaining control of major political 
and military locations, the coup members did not meet the most crucial goal, which was 
to remove President Pérez from office. The coup propelled its leader, Hugo Chávez, to 
heroic popularity throughout Venezuela.237 Hugo Chávez asks as a condition to his 
surrender to appear on television to call on his collaborators surrender and a stop to the 
violence.238 According to Margarita López Maya, “his image…moved Venezuelans who 
were disgusted by irresponsible, insensitive, and corrupt politicians,”239 while Teodoro 
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Petkoff viewed the event as a spark that the nation was yearning for and thus began the 
creation of Hugo Chávez as the savior of Venezuela.240 The coup’s defeat and later 
incarceration was the necessary components for Hugo Chávez to promote an alternative 
government.  
The coup may not have obtained their goal, but it did mark the beginning of the 
end for the disgraced president, with his impeachment and house arrest a year later. By 
1993, President Pérez was impeached due to corruption charges of “diverting $17 million 
of public money to a secret fund,” but his legitimacy was already damaged with a failed 
economy due to the 1980s oil bust, inability to sell austerity measures that affected the 
poorest segments of society, and the 1992 coup.241 Pérez claimed the funds went toward 
Violeta Chamorro’s campaign for president of Nicaragua.242 According to López Maya, 
the “president’s destitution,”243 along with other significant social unrests, led to the final 
demise of Punto Fijo. Corruption no longer remained a tool for stability among political 
parties but now an element of disapproval from its citizens. 
E. THE RISE OF HUGO CHAVEZ, THE POLITICIAN 
Hugo Chávez, while imprisoned, began to reevaluate the approach of effecting the 
government through force and decided to play the democratic game. Mentors like Luis 
Miquellina and Nedo Paniz, assisted in a new democratic plan to change Venezuela and 
convinced Chávez to abandon the military approach.244 Chávez, along with the MBR 
200, soon entered political life after their release from prison in March 1994, through a 
vigorous campaign, or “street activism.”245 Hugo Chávez became the face of a new 
movement, the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), which created a “parallel structure to 
the MBR 200; they used this vehicle to run in and ultimately win the December 1998 
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presidential elections.”246 From these activist beginnings, the political outsider was able 
to penetrate Venezuela’s government and enact radical changes to the status quo of 
Venezuela. 
The populist approach to centralization under one charismatic leader, penetrated 
Venezuela through the structure of the MVR and the 1999 constitution that 
institutionalize corruption. The MVR became the means for Chávez to gain political 
support, as much as a political party would for a politician running for office. Conversely, 
unlike traditional political parties, MVR was created without “internal debate or any 
pretensions of providing an ideological formation for its members…thus, it facilitated an 
organizational style in which the personal nature of authority became decisive.”247 As a 
result, the inability of “collective leadership” meant that Chávez was an “indispensable 
part” of its survival.248 As mention previously in the chapter, Chávez had no desire to 
make MVR a political party, because he was able to concentrate power with virtually no 
opposition. MVR remained fragile and at the whim of Chávez and his prerogatives for 
party ideologies, which made Chávez an uncontested force in the political arena.  
F. START OF CHÁVISMO 
The start of Chávismo began with Hugo Chávez’s first term through the creation 
of a new constitution that created a populist, neo-patrimonial system, consistent with his 
Bolivarian Revolution. The Bolivarian Revolution, named after the 19th century 
Venezuela liberator, Simón Bolívar, was created as a peaceful movement to enact a 
democratic socialism that “repels perceived imperialism and rewards nationalism while 
promoting economic self-sufficiency of the nation as a whole.”249 The timing of the 
Revolution occurred within the context of Venezuela as a “disoriented economy, with a 
social fabric worn thin as the result of poverty, a growing informal sector, rising 
unemployment rates, insecurity, and corruption [that] all contributed to undermining the 
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bases of democracy, which was sustained by the political parties, institutions, and 
politically powerful groups since 1958.”250 López Maya claims that at this time people 
radicalized and wanted to get rid of the old elites and thus, was susceptible to the 
“possibility for a populist rupture.”251 Accordingly, Chávez was able to incorporate 
populist traits such as the “radical and polarizing anti-neoliberal discourse like, for 
example, Chávez calling to ‘fry the heads’ of the corrupt traditional elites.”252 The 
staying power of Chávez’s charisma allowed for populism to take root. 
The new constitution incorporated participative democratic elements into the 
populist system. Political reforms endorsed in the constitution created a more 
“participative and [protagonist]” democracy through four types of popular referenda and 
provided for legislative initiatives, assemblies, and other participatory measures.253 Other 
changes involve the removal of the Senate and creation of a unicameral Asambla 
Nacional (Article 186), president’s decree powers (Article 236), and prohibition of public 
financing for political parties (article 67).254 The participatory democracy approach 
involved a stronger centralization on the president and a weakness of the opposition 
forces through traditional political structures, seen as a means to replace the status quo of 
Punto Fijo. López Maya also claims social reforms included an extension of human rights 
through the protection of the right of indigenous groups to self-determination and secure 
respect for culture, environmental rights, recognition of domestic work as value 
economic activity, and housewives’ right to social security.255 Economically, the state 
was the center for control of oil resources and thus, the state became able to expropriate 
land and firms for political and economic motives as well as maintain the goal of wealth 
redistribution, all under the control of the president.256 These constitutional changes 
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allowed for the rise in corruption by removing traditional democratic institutions, to 
include key accountability and separation of power mechanisms, because they were the 
tools of the corrupt Punto Fijo system. The centralization of power in Chávez, gave him 
power to orchestrate neo-patrimonial networks among Chávismo supporters, also known 
as Chavistas. 
1. Military Evolution 
Another major reform in the 1999 constitution was with the military’s oversight 
and their roles and missions in social development that created a powerful neo-
patrimonial network between the Armed Forces and Chávez. The military was protected 
under Hugo Chávez, who saw them as an underutilized force in relation to domestic 
issues consistent with Chávismo. Deborah Norden acknowledged that the Venezuelan 
government “approached the military as a potential political partner, rather than the 
politically neutral instrument envision in the liberal model.”257 Petkoff described 
Chávez’s Venezuela as, “for all practical purposes… a government of the Armed 
Forces.”258 The Constitution gave the military the right to vote (article 330), remove the 
legislative’s role in military promotions (article 331), and the mission of “active 
participation in national development” (article 328).259 Hugo Chávez said in his 1999 
inaugural speech that “our brothers-in-arms cannot be locked away in barracks, on naval 
bases, and air bases with their great ability, great human capital, and vast resources as if 
they were deactivated, as if it were another world separate from an astonishing reality, a 
cruel reality that clamors for an injection of resources, morale, and discipline.”260 The 
new role created a strong tie between the military and the political government, with what 
Deborah Norden illustrates, the replacement of military officers in public administration 
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have them committed to the “political agenda” of the administration.261 Corruption began 
to be linked to the military, due to their positions in the government, politicization among 
the officer corps, and secretive manner of the programs’ finances.  
The military oversight control was altered to remove the Asembla Nacional for 
the president, to include officer’s promotions. The promotion system became the 
“exclusive prerogative of the National Armed Forces,”262 which removed legislation’s 
approval from the process. The President’s new responsibility with the military was 
marked in Article 236, “to exercise supreme command over the National Armed Forces, 
promote their officers to the rank of colonel or naval captain and above, and appoint them 
to the positions exclusively reserved to them.”263 This right was extended to all ranks 
through the 2002 Organic laws or Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada. The reform placed 
the onus of military leadership directly on the president, omitting other forms of civilian 
oversight to manage the forces. The change diminished the guarantee that promotions 
were conducted through “merit, hierarchy, and vacancies”; thus, possibly determined by 
political loyalty instead.264 Trinkunas argues that the action of removing the 
constitutional protection of legislative oversight on promotions, removed the “important 
effect of self-censoring ambitious military officers into compliance with the policies of 
elected officials.”265 Leopoldo Colmenares also states that the “high number of charges 
of corruption, illicit opportunism, and criminal activities demonstrated that, more simply 
supporting Chávez and the ‘revolution,’ a strong number of those individuals [military 
officers] sought personal gain.”266 The reform created a neo-patrimonial network among 
military officers whose loyalties were obtained through rank, furthering corruption 
among military officers. 
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The military roles and missions reform of leading social development programs 
additionally raised corrupt influences on Venezuela with their use in bureaucratic, 
political capacity with no oversight or accountability mechanisms. Since Chávez knew 
best and trusted the institution, along with the new controls bestowed to him in the 
constitution, the use of military officers appeared to facilitate the most efficient vehicle 
for his agenda. Chávez was able to not only place military members, both active duty and 
retired, in political and bureaucratic positions throughout the government,267 the control 
of their promotions and assignments made loyalty ensured. Initiatives like Plan Bolívar 
2000 and later Misiones were the vehicles in which the military was politicized and 
allegations of corruption began to surface. Examples of military social development jobs 
included, “infrastructure refurbishment and construction, health care for the poor, 
combating illiteracy and unemployment, and food distribution.”268 It also involved the 
hiring of civilians under the direction of military officers and soldiers selling “basic 
goods at below-market prices to hold down costs in lower- and working-class 
marketplaces.”269 Reports of corruption emerged with Plan Bolívar 2000, through 
irregularities in the administration of the initiatives’ monies and “diversion of 
government resources into funding a civic action plan under the auspices of the military, 
which used secret regulations to shield its activities from scrutiny.”270 Also, reports 
surfaced that “more than $150 million bolivars disappeared from the plan without any 
accountability for expenditures.”271 Colmenares claims that investigations in these 
allegations found irregularities and charges were filed against key members in charge of 
the finances; however, no legal discipline resulted.272 The impunity of the military was 
thus solidified and continued the neo-patrimonial system of military loyalty to Chávez 
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through lucrative assignments that provided personal gain to the military officers at the 
expense of the citizen. 
2. Social Development 
In 2003, the Missions or misiones were created as an evolution of Plan Bolívar 
2000 and a means to garner support to promulgate Chávismo, which resulted in 
furthering corruption through the rewarding of loyalty with program scholarship. The aim 
of the Misiones were to target the poorest segments of the nation through socialist 
programs in health care, education, food distribution, administration of identification 
cards, housing, and job-creation co-operatives.273 The financing of these projects came 
from the state-ran oil company, PDVSA, and managed by the president.274 Michael 
Penford-Becerra argues that Chávez used misiones as a political tool through a neo-
patrimonial network, where states loyal to Chávez, with Chavista governors, “benefited 
more in terms of access to scholarships than those states controlled by the opposition.”275 
Penford-Becerra argues that one specific mission, Misión Ribas, was a clientelistic 
network that “mix[ed] public and exclusable goods [cash transfers] within a program, the 
government was able to secure their political investment by making credible their popular 
appeal, but also ‘buying’ support through networks developed at the regional level with 
the backing from Chavista governors.”276 Corruption was cemented into the political 
practice of Venezuela, with Chávez’s prerogatives to accomplish his agenda in a 
concentrated clientelist framework maintained through presidential control. 
G. VENEZUELA’S GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION  
Hugo Chávez incorporated a populist style of government that created a parallel 
structure to the democratic institutions in place, including removing accountability 
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mechanisms, which accelerates corruption. According to Norberto Ceresole, Chávez’s 
Venezuela fits the mold of a post-democracy, which is a “regime with a central 
charismatic leader, the army fulfilling the role of the ‘party,’ and the mobilization of the 
people through direct links with the leader.”277 Key elements of populist governments are 
found throughout Chávez’s rhetoric, with his anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalization 
positions, polarization of Chavistas versus anti-Chavistas, military involvement in 
politics and social development, and centralization of the government under the 
president’s control. The government, during the highest rates of oil prices, saw 
“unbridled spending…[that] exacerbated the state’s paternalism.”278 Vladmir Torres 
claims issues with Venezuela’s centralization of power on the president that permeated 
into the electoral body: “international electoral observers highlighted a lack of trust in 
Venezuela’s National Electoral Council,” with “high levels of inaccuracies and 
illegalities in the permanent electoral registry,” where the Venezuelan government has 
“denied independent auditing of the registry”279 to investigate allegations. Torres claims, 
“neo-populist grip on power, increased by the oil-generated resources, allows 
[Venezuela] to show its contempt and disregard for democratic demands.”280 The push 
for populist leaders, like Chávez, to seek power through the disregard of democratic 
practices led Venezuela to see a change in their perception of corruption, due to the 
increase need to use clientelist networks to secure power. 
The perception of corruption began to change throughout the implementation of 
Chávismo, one year after the ratification of the constitution. According to López Maya, 
weak liberal institutions marked Chávez’s Venezuela, along with no separation of powers 
or fully competitive elections, and blurring of state, government, party, and participatory 
social organization boundaries.281 She also claims, “the diversity of participatory 
innovations from the first period (1998-2006) was weakened in order to make space for 
                                                 
277 Torres, “The Impact of “Populism on Social, Political and Economic Development in the 
Hemisphere,” 9. 
278 Ibid., 9. 
279 Ibid.,12. 
280 Ibid. 
281 López Maya, “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Populist Left,” 236. 
 55 
the communal councils … [as well as] civil and political rights were [also] weakened.”282 
According to Latinobarómetro surveys, the percentage of citizens that believe corruption 
has increased rose to 72.6% out of 1200 respondents in 2002 from 52.5% in 2000, at the 
start of Chávismo.283 While the numbers are not in the 90th percentile, like during the 
late 1990s, it does show that a majority of those polled believed that corruption rose with 
the 2001 Latinobarómetro surveys, also claimed that 86.3% of citizens polled believed 
that corruption was a very serious issue for Venezuela.284 While it is difficult to pinpoint 
corruption’s rise to the introduction of Chávismo, based on the new reforms’ dependence 
on clientelist networks has shown corrupt practices filling a gap left by the removal of 
traditional institutions like political parties. Thus, corruption as the tool of obtaining 
support among the weak institutional structure that Chávismo created shows similarities 
to what occurred during Punto Fijo. The difference between Punto Fijo and Chávismo is 
Chávismo’s incorporation of the poor through vote buying, making those voters more 
willing to give up accountability and transparency for continued support of social 
programs.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Hugo Chávez became the 64th president of Venezuela in 1998 and created a new 
form of government that focuses on populist and neo-patrimonial principles. The 
principles include, a redistribution of wealth and reduction of corruption with the use of 
polarizing rhetoric, centralization of power at the executive, and support buying through 
social development projects and Chavistas’ advancement. By 2000, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index ranked Venezuela 71st with a score of 2.7.285 
Fifteen years after the introduction of Chávismo, Venezuela climbed up to 161st with a 
score of 19.286 According to Leslie Gates, “according to the… Corruption Perception 
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Index, Venezuela’s corruption has been getting worse since 2002… [and] Venezuela’s 
level of transparency in the region, its CPI score was the lowest in history at 2.0 in 
2007.”287 She goes on to state “furthermore, 2007 was only the third time in the history 
of Transparency International’s ratings that Venezuela ranked higher than 90th 
percentile—indicating that 90% of countries were perceived as having better 
transparency than Venezuela.”288 Corruption, which was the reason for the 
disillusionment of Punto Fijo, increased dramatically, along with the continuation of 
weak governance, through Chávismo. Corruption became the tool of the populist and neo 
patrimonial system of Chávismo because of its need to gain support through clientelist 
procedures such as the social development programs of Plan Bolívar 2000 and Misiones, 
significant constitutional changes that increased power to the president, and removal of 
accountability mechanisms. The result was weaker governance than before that 
exacerbated corruption through its political system. Scholars, like Jennifer McCoy and 
Leslie Gates, argue that the clientelist network created under Punto Fijo was a stabilizing 
necessity to ensure the survivability of democracy and thus, was a success story amid the 
collapse of democracies throughout Latin America.289 Unfortunately, the dramatic drop 
in oil prices in the 1980s and the unpopular neo-liberal policies created an image of 
corruption as the malefactor of the weakness of the state. The opportunity that the 
turbulent times created in Venezuela allowed the ability of populist rhetoric to penetrate 
and create Chávismo. Michael Shifter claims, “regardless of whether the conditions of 
Venezuela’s poor have marginally improved or marginally worsened under Chávez, his 
‘Bolivarian Revolution’ is hardly a sustainable model…its approach is fundamentally 
clientelistic, perpetuating dependence on state patronage rather than promoting broad-
base development.”290 As a result, Chávismo has shown to have further weakened 
Venezuela’s governance through the institutionalization of clientelist networks that used 
the social programs as a bribe to obtain more centralized power in the state. The outcome 
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is a steady rise in corruption’s perception than under the previous pluralist two-party 
Punto Fijo system. Venezuela’s vicious cycle was created within its weak governance 
model, Chávismo, forming a dependency on corrupt practices to sustain its power despite 
corruption being the very issue that primed the population to demand a new political 
system. The result becomes Venezuela holding redistribution of wealth through social 
development programs at ransom for loyalty to Chávismo. 
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III. VENEZUELA OIL CURSE 
In 2015, Venezuela surpassed Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest reserve of 
oil,291 which poised the state to be the pinnacle of economic strength; however, the 
country is far from a beacon of economic prosperity. A closer look at the petroleum giant 
reveals a state struggling with a corrupt government, an opportunistic military 
establishment, a weak industrial/service economy, and an over-dependence on oil 
revenue.292 Richard Auty analyzed this occurrence in a theory called the “Resource 
Curse,” which he explains happens when “a country, usually developing, has an 
abundance of a natural resource that is in high demand. The resource creates a dependent, 
inflated economy and leads to conflict, corruption, and poverty.”293 Venezuela 
experienced times of high oil revenues in the early 2000s that shielded President 
Chávez’s cracked economic policies. What exactly occurred under the umbrella of high 
oil revenue that intensified the Resource Curse in Venezuela during Chávez’s presidency, 
thus increasing corruption? Chapter III defines the Resource Curse, how it manifested in 
Venezuela’s economic policy through a Rentier State and Dutch Disease further 
intensifying corruption, and how President Hugo Chávez’s Cháveznomics was protected 
under high oil revenue, which allowed the prepensely of poor economic decisions. 
Cháveznomics resulted in creating a Rentier state that due to poor economic policies 
suffer from Dutch Disease, lack of transparency, and increased clientelist relationships 
deepening corruption under the umbrella of high oil revenue. 
A. RESOURCE CURSE  
The Resource Curse theoretically identifies the potential downsides of a country 
rich in non-renewable mineral resources like oil. The theory claims that a country with an 
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abundance of oil may eventually suffer understandably from an overdependence on that 
resource. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines mineral dependence as 
“minerals [that] account for 25% or more of the value of [a country’s] merchandise 
exports.”294 Such oil over-dependence can lead to a decline in economic growth because 
oil actually becomes “an obstacle to development.”295 Oxford Policy Management 
determined the “risk that substantial changes in commodity prices” can impact a 
country’s development.296 Additionally, several countries are seen to have “squandered” 
their oil revenue, like Nigeria. Nigeria earned $350 billion in oil revenues since their 
independence but saw their economy shrink from $1,113 GDP in 1970 to $1,084 GDP in 
2000 while poverty rose from 36% to 70%.297 There has been extensive research on the 
reasons why countries with an influx of revenue through their valuable natural resource 
lead to adverse economic and social health.  
Previous assumptions thought that a country with rich resources would become a 
stronger state. In the 1950s and 1960s, Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong 
described that the logic from development economists was that “[resource-rich] countries 
would grow much faster than their resource-poor counterparts precisely because their 
mineral wealth would provide them with the necessary capital to industrialize and 
diversify their exports.”298 Nevertheless, the assumption was that increased money would 
automatically create the desire to diversify and industrialize. No thought was given to 
how the increase in money might bring about other initiatives that favored a reallocation 
of the revenue to a more concentrated sector of the population. The research began to 
change in the 1960s-1990s, in those resource rich and poor countries. Examples include 
the East Asia “tigers,” mineral-poor countries that saw an increase in economic growth 
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from the early 1960s to the 1990s, while the Latin American mineral-rich countries, 
experienced economic stagnation or decline.299 It was not until the 1990s that researchers 
started to see natural resources as a potential curse and even the “root-cause of 
[country’s] political and economic problems.”300  
Results of the Resource Curse led to poor standing in corruption and governance 
ratings. Oil-rich countries had the lowest global ranking in the 2006 World Bank 
Governance Research Indicators and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index.301 Other factors that are judged to measure governance strength include 
government types and standards of living, shared the same low global rankings with 
government systems being authoritarian or those that actively impede democratic 
transitions. Oil acknowledged as a curse for a state allowed the research to change former 
assumptions, with a shift toward studying the downfall of the economy and political 
systems.  
Research also shows a strong correlation between countries that show a high 
dependence on oil exports, corruption, and poor governance. The primary reason has to 
do with the incentives generated by windfall revenue for the ruling elites.302 Alina Rocha 
Menocal et al. also articulate that the dependence on windfall oil rents show an autonomy 
of the state from its citizens, or the requirement to answer the public through political 
goods. This freedom decreases the need for “accountability, disarticulating the link 
between state and society, enabling those who rule to command vast patronage 
networks”303 Government public services become a “favor” rather than a “right” that can 
be demanded by the population.304 
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The new view of oil being a potential curse looked at how states use the increased 
revenue. Weinthal and Luong illustrate that scholars identified two aspects of the 
Resource Curse: “economic consequences of sustained growth and the adverse impacts 
that reliance on external rents has on governance, state capacity, and democracy under 
the volatility of the commodity market.”305 Rent is defined as the “return over a resource 
owner’s opportunity costs,” which in the case of oil is from foreign sources.306 The oil 
market is a volatile market with several booms and busts. Boom and Bust cycles can have 
a severe effect on economic growth. The management of oil’s boom and bust cycles is a 
major contributor to the downfall of economies because oil busts cause catastrophic 
effects due to their economy’s over-dependence on oil. “Economic importance of 
petroleum makes this particular commodity both a valuable and an attractive political 
tool.”307 Petroleum income makes government budgets difficult to manage, due to the 
significant revenue fluctuations, so investing in meaningful public services becomes 
challenging, while also “discourages private investment.”308 Borrowing on oil futures 
becomes a large factor in increasing a country’s debt instead of reinvesting into economic 
diversification. The debt causes a serious issue during a bust cycle when the loan 
payments are due with no funds available to pay them. 
1. Dutch Disease 
“Dutch Disease” is a factor of the Resource Curse that affects rates of economic 
growth because of the volatility of the oil market. Dutch Disease is the result of the 
windfalls from oil revenue that leads to an “appreciation of the real exchange rate by 
shifting production inputs to the booming mineral sector and non-tradable sector, 
reducing the competitiveness of the non-booming export industries.”309 Dutch Disease 
makes it difficult for economies to sustain their “boom” levels during the bust cycles 
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because non-tradable sectors collapse due to neglect from the government. It also 
“accelerates domestic inflation, which is responsible for the rise in the real exchange 
rate.”310 While the country is gaining more revenue and currency is strengthening, the 
effect on the non-tradable sector becomes weak and jobs are eliminated because of their 
inability to remain competitive in the global market. Oil industries are unable to produce 
the jobs to replace those lost in the non-tradable sector, which leads to problems in the 
public arena and a foundation for corruption to fester.  
Dutch Disease has political consequences that can severely weaken a state’s 
institutions and increase corruption. Extreme political consequences of oil dependence, 
according to Weinthal and Luong, can result in “weakly institutionalized states and 
skewed state-societal relations.”311 Their argument centers on the notion that there is no 
incentive to create efficient bureaucracies because they focus decision-making on a “rigid 
and myopic (short-sided) model.”312 Politicians that obtain windfall rents can exaggerate 
corruption due to the government’s pressure that oil creates to maintain the maximum 
amount of revenue. A “feeding frenzy” can occur that distracts both individuals and 
governments from long-term development to gain the most from the windfall rents.313 
The revenue motivates governments to keep the money to create a richer elite rather than 
reinvestment into necessary economic sectors or invest into the rest of society.  
2. Rentier State 
An aliment of the Resource Curse deals with extreme overdependence on oil that 
transforms the state into a Rentier State. A Rentier State is defined as a state that is 
dependent on their natural resource that they sell to make a substantial profit and, thus, the 
states’ primary function becomes distributing rent. The distribution of rents tends to go to 
the most influential individuals within a government who are closest to the revenue, 
excluding everyone else. Dependence on oil means 50% or more of exports on the mineral. 
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The theory incorporates elements such as “corruption, economic stagnation, and 
authoritarianism as features inherent to the Rentier political economy.”314 The reason for 
these factors becoming inherent is because the Rentier state needs to seek control and 
maintain dependency on oil through the state’s authority while maximizing the most rent 
collection.  
Despite the consequences of Rentier States on governance, there are positive 
effects. The argument of Rentier states and peace suggest that the oil revenues “provide 
ruling elites the ability to offset these indirect adverse effects on security.”315 The idea 
being that the elite could distribute the rent selectively creating a “clientelist” network to 
ensure stability through accommodation of political rivals to avoid a conflict to occur from 
power factions as seen in Venezuela’s Punto Fijo political system.316 The rise of corruption 
becomes a cost of maintaining stability and also sacrifices the ability of democratic 
transitions or viable redistributions of wealth to the poorest sectors of the population. Also, 
these Rentier states are unable to respond to economic busts since their “bureaucracies are 
too centralized and bloated to adjust, [and] sectorial interests have captured the policy-
making process or some combination.”317 As a result, the stability achieved is weak and 
could be disrupted by a downturn of oil prices, similar to the case of Venezuela during the 
1970s severe oil busts. 
B. VENEZUELA’S ECONOMIC MODEL: PAST AND PRESENT 
Venezuela’s abundance of oil has led to a history of failed economic models used 
to attempt to temper the Resource Curse. Javier Corrales from Harvard University’s 
David Rockefeller Center compiled the former economic models to include 
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1. Heterodox stabilization (1985–1998) 
2. Shock therapy (1989–1992) 
3. Gradualism (1996–1998) 
4. Reforms by executive “special powers” (early 1980s, 1993–1994,1998) 
5. Changes by negotiations with opposition parties (1996–1998) 
6. Stabilization through price controls (1994–1996) 
7. Deep trade liberalization (1990–1993) 
8. Concessions to economic losers from trade liberalization (1994–1998) 
9. Direct subsidies to vulnerable sectors (1990–1992).318  
 
Corrales coined those economic policies of the 1980s and 90s as the “ax-relax-
collapse” cycle of reform. The ax-relax-collapse cycle begins with an economic crisis, 
where the government then implements harsh cutbacks and adjustments (ax).319 Once 
there is some relief the changes are lax or abandoned (relax), which results in another 
crisis (collapse).320 The societal context of Venezuela over income equality showed the 
damages of the ax-relax-collapse cycle. In 1998, according to the GINI index that 
measures income inequality (0 means equal and 100 unequal), Venezuela scored a 
49.80.321 The ax-relax-collapse policies and a high GINI coefficient led to a population 
disenfranchised with the political two-party system of Punto Fijo and the willingness of 
the public to take the risk on a former coup leader, Hugo Chávez Frías, as President.  
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Hugo Chávez entered political office with a new economic model, Cháveznomics 
to overcome the consequences of the Resource Curse. In 1998, Hugo Chávez won the 
presidency with a landslide victory of 56% of the votes.322 He initiated a populist 
political system that focused on socialist measures such as empowering the citizens to 
take ownership in their country and the redistribution of wealth. Chávez also introduced a 
populist economic policy, Cháveznomics. According to Kirk Hawkins, populist economic 
policies have two levels: “macro decisions about large fiscal allocations and the structure 
of economic governance and the micro decisions about the design of specific 
programs.”323 Populist economic policies can go to either right or left of the political 
spectrum under the guise of the “interaction of populist ideas with the broader 
socioeconomic context and the interest it generates.”324 In the case of Venezuela, 
Cháveznomics was left leaning because the primary driver was the redistribution of 
wealth and eradicating poverty. Hawkins identifies that “radical redistributive policies are 
the most likely corollaries of populist governments in Latin America.”325 Venezuela 
experienced times of economic crisis specifically with the 1980s oil busts and neoliberal 
reforms that disenfranchised the poor. Chávez attempted to alleviate the crisis with a 
strong approach toward redistribution. According to Francisco Rodríguez, Venezuela’s 
economic model is a “populist macroeconomics” model, which is “the use of 
expansionary fiscal and economic policies and an overvalued currency with the intention 
of accelerating growth and redistribution…[while also] controlling inflationary pressures 
through price and exchange controls.”326 Redistribution manifested in Cháveznomics in 
new social programs that focused on the poorest segments of society. 
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The 1999 Constitution that Chávez’s administration implemented, stipulated a 
more centralized socialist approach to economics. Institutions created were public health 
system, free public education, social security, and strict workers rights.327 Cháveznomics 
also included hard currency and price controls through subsidies on food and fuel.328 
Currency exchange controls made dollars sold at three times the official rates with the 
lowest rate of 6.3 bolivars to the dollar for food and essential household items.329 The 
currency system allows importers to purchase dollars at an artificially low price but caps 
the price of goods the merchants would resell. According to Danielle Renwick and 
Brianna Lee, the subsidized currency exchange controls “created incentives to cheat,” 
and as of December 2015, a thriving black market existed where the black market’s 
exchange rate is nine hundred bolivars to the dollar.330 The informal institution fueled an 
economic crisis and normalized corrupt practices throughout the state. 
State control of the economy was another factor in Cháveznomics that 
exacerbated the consequences of the Resource Curse. Even though nationalization of 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) and natural gas occurred during Punto Fijo, 
Chávez strengthen control over the use of windfall rents to finance his social 
development proposals, based on the constitution stating: “oil belongs to the 
state…whomever governs the state also governs the fate of the countries lucrative oil 
reserves.”331 Chávez abandoned corporate independence and restructured PDVSA with 
Chavistas (Chávez loyalists).  
Chávez’s new decree powers also placed higher taxes on PDVSA profits and 
closer regulation of PDVSA business, which was also controlled by Chávez. According 
to Hawkins, Chávez publicly fired top managers of PDVSA, during one of Chávez’s Aló 
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Presidente television programs in April 2002, because of claims of being “corrupt 
technocrats who were allies of the old party system.”332 The broadcast led to strong 
opposition and demonstrations. A two-month strike began on December 2, 2002, which 
served a significant blow to production levels from 3.3 million barrels to 700,000 
barrels.333 The government “rationed dollars and imposed price controls to compensate 
for the downward spiral of the economy.”334 After the strikes in 2003, Chávez made 
PDVSA more politicized by replacing executives with Chavistas to ensure loyalty and 
prevent a reoccurrence of a strike. Rodríguez comments that the move to replace PDVSA 
technocrats with Chavista loyalists, along with other poor policy choices had led to “the 
capacity of oil revenues to ease the government’s fiscal constraints, becoming more and 
more limited.”335 The strikes did not lead to Chávez’s demise as expected, but the strikes 
did expose cracks in Cháveznomics with the umbrella of high oil revenue slowly 
retracting because of a drop in oil production and other policies that affected PDVSA’s 
efficiency.  
Other industries followed a similar fate as PDVSA and fell under the purview of 
the state. In 2007, Chávez nationalized the country’s largest telecommunications 
company, CANTV and the Caracas electricity company, EdC, paying out American 
owners Verizon and AES.336 Other government acquisitions involved electric utilities, 
banks, sugar mills, and agricultural supplies totaling $22.8 billion, along with “setting up 
joint ventures with ‘friendly’ countries in businesses like bicycle factories and oil.”337 
The results of Venezuela’s “re-nationalization” have shown adverse effects such as a 
decrease in productivity, which affected their performance in international markets.  
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Social Development was a major element of Cháveznomics that was meant to 
serve as the key factor to elevate the burden of the Resource Curse. Chávez’s plans 
included a redistribution program and social development projects to get directly at the 
people, in-line with a 2004 government slogan, “Now Venezuela belongs to 
everyone.”338 Chávez believed that the previous administrations lost sight of the people 
and set out to radically transform that position. As soon as he entered office, Chávez 
created Plan Bolívar 2000. The plan was organized into three parts, Pro-Country, Pro-
Homeland, and Pro-Nation.339 Plan Bolívar 2000 worked on community beautification 
projects, improvements to schools, road building, healthcare for the poor, and distribution 
of basic foodstuffs in street markets.340 The Army was the administrators of the program. 
In Chávez’s 1999 inaugural speech, he stated that the army’s brilliant human capital was 
not to be wasted but used toward national development, and twenty-three days later, he 
began to execute Plan Bolívar.341 The plan ended in 2001 with good press for the 
President despite rumors of corruption and misappropriation of resources from the 
military.342 Chávez, however, claimed that Plan Bolívar 2000 did succeed in the mission 
to “transform civil-military relations in Venezuela.”343  
1. Venezuela Misiones 
In 2003, Venezuela attempted another social development project to take 
advantage of the increases in oil revenue and remedy the failures of Plan Bolívar 2000. 
Christ Missions (Misión Cristo) was designed to eliminate poverty by 2021 from a six-
year plan, Líneas Generales del Plan de Desarollo Económico y Social de la Nación.344 
Hawkins states that unlike other social development programs in the region, Chávez set 
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out to create programs that stressed co-operatives, state coordination, and local know-
how.345 The initial missions that stemmed from Misión Cristo included health and 
education with the Cuban Medical Mission and the Bolivarian Literacy Campaign.346 
Cuban doctors came to establish modern clinics under an agreement with Cuba.347 A 
literacy mission was also created as a plan of Chávez to eradicate illiteracy; however, 
showed an average performance of 200,000 people educated in two years.348 As a result, 
in 2003, Cuban educators were brought in and the Cuban literacy program “Yo, Sí 
Puedo” (YSP) was implemented.349 Several more missions were created that expanded 
their initial scope with food distributions and job training.  
Chávez’s Misiones were financed by oil and exposed the leftist intentions of 
Chávez, populist ideals, and corruption. The missions were under tight control of Chávez 
and his Chavistas while funding came primarily from revenue transfers from PDVSA, 
and with no legislative branch’s oversight.350 Analysis of the misiones is difficult due to 
the secretive manner in which the government kept information.351 What is determined 
from these programs is that the programs served more as a political tool rather than a pro-
poor initiative. For example, economist Joseph Stiglitz praises the efforts of the misiones, 
“Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez seems to have succeeded in bringing education and 
health services to the barrios of Caracas, which previously had seen little of the benefits 
of that country’s rich endowment of oil.”352 From 1998 to 2012, poverty declined from 
about 50% to 30% and according to the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America, 
poverty fell by 21% between 2002 and 2008.353 Yet there are others that claim that the 
misiones were a waste. Economic critics saw these programs as money being “frittered 
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away on consumption that boosts Chávez’s popularity, rather than being invested in 
social and economic infrastructure.”354 Rodríguez also states “there is remarkably little 
data supporting the claim that the Chávez’s administration has acted any differently from 
previous Venezuelan governments-or, for that matter, from those of other developing and 
Latin American nations-in redistributing the gains from economic growth to the poor.”355 
Despite these conflicting claims, the popularity of the misiones among the population 
who were direct recipients of the programs was strong enough to assist in Chávez’s 
reelection in 2006.  
Regardless of the debate on misiones’ impact, the foundations of the social 
development programs worsened corruption. Analysis done by Kirk Hawkins over a 
sampling of misiones determined that their populist approach in discretionary spending 
through “clientelism” embodied the personalized relationship of deference and levels of 
partisan biases in program allocations.356 In other words, Chavistas were able to reap the 
most benefit from the programs making aid recipients disproportionately Chavistas. 
Chávez was able to survive the worst moments of financial crisis due to his aggressive 
redistribution campaigns that enjoyed the increased level of revenue from high oil prices. 
Francisco Rodríguez asserts that “the story of Chávez as a social revolutionary finally 
redressing the injustices created by centuries of oppression fits nicely into traditional 
stereotypes of the region, reinforcing the view that Latin American underdevelopment is 
due to the vices of its predatory governing classes.”357 This claim allows weak policies to 
take the place of legitimate strategies and his image of the poor’s savior remains in tact 
despite the growing disparity within the state. Corruption, as a result, was used to buy off 
respective supporters throughout the state to further Chávez’s weak oil revenue 
management decisions. 
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2. International Alliances 
Cháveznomics spread corruption through their international policies that share oil 
with other countries in exchange for alliances, like the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and Petrocaribe. Discount oil became the lure to create 
the clientelist relationships at the detriment to Venezuela. In 2004, ALBA was a coalition 
created with Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Chávez as a trade agreement that created an 
international security apparatus. Its mission is to “be an alliance of people to fulfill the 
dreams of Bolívar and Martí for a united and sovereign Latin America.”358 Oil was used 
as bait to attract members with the slogan of “my enemy’s enemies are my friends.”359 
The alliance was created as a reaction to the Washington Consensus and the attempted 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that the United States was actively pursuing in 
the region.360 Membership grew to include Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
several Caribbean states. ALBA appeared as a relationship of likeminded polities than a 
viable security or economic bloc. Other members from outside the region were Russia, 
Iran, and China to round out the list of alliances.  
Petrocaribe was created as a complement to ALBA, which enriched the clientelist 
relationship throughout the region. Petrocaribe is a trade agreement that creates alliances 
with certain Latin American countries and establish an international clientelism network. 
The agreement is a Caribbean regional oil initiative created in 2005, where Venezuela 
offered discounted oil totaling 400,000 b/d to 17 oil-importing countries in Central 
America and the Caribbean.361 The alliance stipulated that it would cover 40% of the 
regional energy needs and recipient countries would pay 40% of the oil invoice value 
within the first 90 days. The remainder of the oil amount would be financed at a 1% 
interest rate over 25 years.362 There were some adjustments to the agreement, with 
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Venezuela providing 53,000 b/d (60%) of Cuba’s energy needs in exchange for medical 
technology and services and the Dominican Republic trading foodstuffs for oil. 
According to an article from the Economist, “between 2011 and 2013…[Petrocaribe] cost 
Venezuela an average of $2.3 billion each year in lost income.”363 The article goes to 
state, “so far, the desire for influence in the Caribbean has outweighed economic 
pressures in Venezuela.”364 Venezuela current economic crisis is the ramifications of 
Cháveznomics policies focus on securing alliances as a priority and results in the 
exportation of corrupt practices. Chávez maintain control on the use of oil revenue 
throughout this entire period and as a result did not factor in planning to manage the oil 
market busts. The growing alliances and trade blocs created a stronger dependence on oil 
then previous administrations. 
D. WINDFALL MANAGEMENT 
Mismanagement of oil revenues or windfall revenue is a major consequence of 
the Resource Curse that facilitates corruption through the abundance of revenue that is up 
for the taking within a state. According to Weinthal and Luong, different means to 
alleviate the Resource Curse can be windfall management through natural resource 
funds.365 Natural Resource Funds consist of stabilization, savings funds, or a 
combination of the two. Weinthal and Luong argue that stabilization funds “reduce 
overspending when prices are high and borrowing when prices fall.”366 The process 
works when “commodity prices are high, excess revenue is placed in the stabilization 
fund, but when prices are low, revenue is transferred out to make up for budgetary 
shortfalls.”367 Venezuela created programs to ensure market safeguards during the oil 
market’s bust periods. Venezuela’s windfall management mechanisms have been around 
since the 1970s, with Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) and Investment Fund for 
                                                 








Macroeconomic Stabilization (FIEM) as mechanisms meant to diversify oil.368 In 2005, 
the Chávez administration modified the FIEM to be more discretionary until they 
abandoned it to create their own.369  
An example of a windfall management mechanism in Venezuela was the National 
Development Fund (FONDEN). FONDEN was a windfall mechanism that was meant as  
“a financial instrument for leveraging economic growth and sustainable development.”370 
The fund was to finance development projects in education and health, both in Venezuela 
and abroad with control centered on Chávez, who had discretionary use.371 The source of 
revenue came from two institutions: revenue of paid PDVSA windfall taxes and 
Venezuela’s Central Bank.372 By 2006, FONDEN had $8.87 billion and FIEM held $768 
million with a government take of rent of $200.68 billion; the combined savings in the 
funds was $9.63 billion by the end of 2006.373 Osmel Manzano and Jose Sebastian 
Scrofina cited Ricardo Hausmann’s argument that the rent distribution model did not 
account for “sharing financial pain” and could not absorb the effects of rent decline.374 
As a result, the funds appeared more as Chávez’s personal account to use in his attempts 
to enact Chávismo policies rather than an economic defense against the volatile oil 
market. 
Mismanagement of windfall revenue occurred in Venezuela due to the decision-
making on how revenue was spent and thus, became susceptible to corruption. Control on 
how to spend windfall revenue is centered on the president. Chávez tapped FONDEN to 
finance his 21st Century Bolivarian Socialism initiatives both domestically and 
internationally. According to Manzano and Scrofina, the government used the revenues 
through budget and off-budget expenditures.375 The government increased spending in 
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the social sector from 34.77% to 45.64% from 1998 to 2009, while reduced spending in 
debt servicing, sub-national government transfers, and defense.376 Off-budget 
expenditures came from PDVSA payments, which funded three major programs outside 
the government budget: social programs, transfers to FONDEN, and direct payments to 
smaller funds like FONDESPA and the Agriculture Trust Fund.377 From 2005 to 2009, 
more than 90% of PDVSA contributions went to social programs and the FONDEN.378 
The reason for the large use of “off-budget” expenditures was due to the “rigid budgetary 
process” that deals with forcing money to go to local governments and also becoming 
susceptible to unions and earmarks.379 Brian Ellsworth and Eyanir Chinea illustrates the 
secrecy of FONDEN has led to a mismanagement of over $100 billion of Venezuela’s oil 
revenue. For example, in the construction of aluminum rolling mill in 2011 was “stalled 
for 18 months for lack of funding,” and dealt with growing “debts with construction 
contractors,” despite at least $312 million already spent.380 The level of secrecy and 
misuse of FONDEN uncover corrupt practices of the mechanisms that are meant to 
provide relief in economic crises. 
The lack of transparency continues to erode the legitimacy and efficiency of 
Cháveznomics, proving how the existence of management mechanisms alone is not 
sufficient to curb the effects of the Resource Curse. For example, in 2006, large 
withdrawals from FONDEN of $3 billion for ordinary spending with no accountability on 
how it was spent, while $12 billion out of $22.5 billion were transferred by the 
government to accounts abroad were unaccounted for.381 José Guerra, a former 
Venezuelan Central Bank officer, reported that the money was used to “buy political 
loyalties in the region in order to consolidate [Chávez’s] political projects and some has 
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been donated to Cuba and Bolivia, among other countries.”382 Other changes included a 
legislative reform to a law that allowed the government to seize what was deemed 
“excess reserves,” which resulted in $5 billion in 2005 for off-budget projects.383 Money, 
therefore, was able to move freely under the discretion of the president. 
The lack of transparency in Cháveznomics was safeguarded through the 
president’s ultimate control of social development projects. Plan Bolívar 2000 and Fondo 
Único Social saw large sums of money that were unaccounted and mismanaged, 
estimating about $150 million bolivars disappeared.384 Investigations of these cases 
amounted to a statement Chávez released that “Perhaps it is an administrative oversight 
that merits a fine; but there is no cause for undue concern,” while military officers in 
charge of the programs were not held accountable.385 The attempts of Chávez’s 
administration to adequately prepare for bust times have proven inefficient. According to 
Weinthal and Luong, National Resource Funds cannot be efficient when there is an 
absence of “stringent checks on and balances against executive authority” and as a result, 
the FONDEN susceptibility to government raiding, “the government when strapped for 
cash frequently altered the fund’s operating rules to expand presidential discretion.”386 
An example of altering of rules occurred with a social program, Mothers of the Barrio. 
This program was to “give cash stipends to mothers in extreme poverty, despite the 
program being “contradicting [FONDEN’s] stated mission to make ‘productive 
investments’ that create jobs and spur development.”387 Ellsworth and Chinea illustrated 
that in 2009, the national comptroller’s office noted “presumed irregularities” with the 
program, including “payments to women who were not registered in the program and did 
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not meet the conditions for participation.”388 The fund then does not survive its purpose 
of protection in case of oil busts because it is being ransacked to finance Chávez’s plan. 
E. VENEZUELA’S RESOURCE CURSE INDICATORS: RENTIER STATE 
AND DUTCH DISEASE  
The Resource Curse’s indicators, Rentier State and Dutch Disease, showed how 
Cháveznomics aggravated the curse’s consequences, especially corruption and an 
unstable economy that was ill-equipped to withstand oil busts. One such aliment, Rentier 
state, has been intensified by Cháveznomics. Economist Edgardo Lander states that 
Venezuela is a Rentier state due to an “increased dependency on revenue from oil 
exports” while the “value of the non-oil exports and private sector exports has fallen in 
absolute terms.”389 From 1996, Venezuela’s oil dependency was about 77.3%.390 In 
2005, it increased to 83.4% and by 2010, 84.2%.391 Venezuela’s oil dependency has 
grown throughout Chávez’s administration with “oil’s share of total export value rose 
from 68.7% in 1998 to 96% by 2014,” making Venezuela’s economy entirely dependent 
on oil.392 Oil accounts for 96% of export earnings, 45% of budget revenues, and 12% of 
GDP.393 Venezuela is subjected to the extreme volatility of the oil market. The barrel of 
oil plummeted down to below $40 per barrel from $110 in June 2014.394 Venezuela’s 
average annual GDP growth was about 5% from 2005 to 2012 and growth slowed to 1% 
in 2013 with projections, from the IMF, has the economy contracting to 10% in 2015 and 
inflation averaging 159%.395 The levels of record high oil prices and Chávez socialist 
initiatives are what made it lucrative for the state to grow so dependent on oil. Kurt 
Weyland articulates that high oil rents supported Chávez’s anti-neoliberal rhetoric over 
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“constraints” and fueled the polarized affect toward the incumbent’s “socioeconomic and 
political order.”396 Maintaining a Rentier State allows for “cushion for established elites 
to avoid political risks by keeping the burden of taxation low and by buying off potential 
opposition with plentiful patronage.”397 Chávez used oil revenues to shield the 
government from having to accomplish more stringent economic reforms that removes 
the focus off of social development and reinvest in the non-oil sector industries to re-
diversify exports.  
A major tenant of a Rentier State model involves the control and distribution of 
rent through a cycle of centralized control at the president that is facilitated by clientelist 
relationships. Chávez gained considerable support from the poor of Venezuela that 
permitted the passing of more authoritarian-like policies since major control over use of 
oil rents rested with Chávez. Thus, the aggressive social development programs 
alleviated the poor’s situation and served as a means to buy votes, in a clientelist process. 
Support can be maintained through the use of oil rents to the poor. Carlos Rossi claims 
that what Chávez orchestrated was a reversal of who is rent seeking, with the “rich 
[being] who want access to what the poor (or some) have; the power over the oil 
wealth.”398 The power the president gained allowed Chávez to arrange a patronage 
system that is not traditionally elite-driven rather poor-driven to secure power through 
“vote buying” with social programs, thus feeding the cycle of power toward the 
president. Venezuela’s foreign policy created a strong dependence on oil to further its 
international ambitions and maintain Venezuela’s Rentier state.  
Another Resource Curse aliment that Venezuela suffers from is Dutch Disease, 
which increased corruption through the black market’s exchange rates. Economist 
Alejandro Gristani labels Venezuela as “an extreme example of Dutch Disease,”399 and 
Renwick and Lee identified “stringent currency and price controls and a thriving black 
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market for U.S. dollars have contributed to inflation, stagnant production, and frequent 
shortages, catalyzing widespread discontent.”400 Cháveznomics affected the economy’s 
ability to move away from its oil dependence. Lander states the dangers of the lowering 
of currency exchange rates because “imports account for such a large share of the 
economy that if the currency were to be devalued to a more reasonable level, it would 
inevitably cause an even greater surge in inflation.”401 Dutch Disease has led to 
corruption within the state with the president of the Venezuelan Central Bank, Edmeé 
Betancourt, illustrating corruption through subsidized foreign exchange. He claims 
foreign exchange capital enters into “shell companies” with “artificial demand, [which is] 
unrelated to productive activities.”402 For example, Ciudad Guayana, once the beacon of 
hope in “breaking the country’s overwhelming dependence on crude oil exports,” was hit 
hard by Cháveznomics nationalization of the city’s steelmaking company in 2008.403 
Nick Miroff states, “today most of [Sidor’s] furnaces sit cold, deprived of raw materials, 
new technology, and reliable labour.”404 Dutch Disease has laid the foundations for more 
informal economic structures that practice corrupt actions like black markets and 
contraband sales of commodities to make up for the lack of relief from the economic 
crisis and the mismanagement of windfall oil rents. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Resource Curse is an ailment that removes a country’s ability to take a rich 
resource, like oil, and create a strong state. The curse’s aliments include Dutch Disease 
and Rentier State, which requires a strong dependence on oil revenue at the cost of other 
export markets. The oil dependence exposes the economy to extreme booms and busts 
(Dutch Disease) and fuels a clientelist network that maintains revenue to the elites 
(Rentier State). The results of the Resource Curse, according to Weinthal and Luong, is 
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an increase in corruption and weak governance, lower standards of living and conditions 
of the poor, and authoritarian regimes or limited democracy.405 Venezuela dealt with the 
effects of the Resource Curse throughout the 14 years of Hugo Chávez administration’s 
policies. The socialist economic model, Cháveznomics, took the windfall revenue and 
redistributed funds to embolden the Rentier State structure that existed in incumbent 
economic models. The result of Chávez’s policies created increased Resource Curse’s 
effects, especially corruption, under an umbrella of high oil revenue. Weyland goes on to 
state “a torrent of revenues, captured by this plebiscitarian leader [Chávez] through the 
destruction of institutional safeguards, has allowed him to repudiate neoliberalism, try to 
trace an alternative development model, and turn ever more radical over 
time.”406Cháveznomics also created an unsustainable system for presidential successor 
Nicolás Maduro, who is experiencing the inherent weakness of the system among 
extremely low oil prices. The strong dependency that Chávez created on oil has been the 
lifeline for the country and with current oil prices below $40/barrel, the ability of this 
new administration to practice the same Cháveznomics principles is proving impossible. 
According to Albert Fishlow, “to sustain social spending, Maduro needs an oil price of 
close to $100 a barrel.407 The abundance of oil has served, as a curse for Venezuela than 
a blessing and Chávez’s plans for a “Bolivarian Revolution” with Cháveznomics appears 
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IV. VENEZUELA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION AS THE WAY 
FORWARD 
This thesis examines the rise of corruption during Hugo Chávez’s administration 
so as to consider anti-corruption solutions that may offer relief to the Venezuelan people. 
Venezuela’s current situation of prevalent food shortages, predatory black markets, and 
180.9%  inflation is unsustainable.408 Venezuela’s oil reserves prime the country with 
more than enough available resources for its citizens; however, corruption develops an 
inequality of resource distribution. Transparency International identifies Venezuela as the 
“ninth most corrupt country in the world…[with] member’s of [President] Maduro’s 
family and immediate entourage implicated in drug smuggling and hundreds of billions 
of dollars are believed to have been syphoned out of the economy.”409 No longer a viable 
model, Chávismo politics cannot fix the current crisis; Venezuelan citizens are ready for 
change and relief from the plague of corruption that has all but consumed their country.  
While Chapter II discussed how Chávez weakened governance through the 
creation of policies that centralized and maintained presidential control, breeding opaque 
transactions, and patronage policies, Chapter III looked at the Resource Curse theory to 
analyze how Cháveznomics created a dangerous over-dependence on oil yet gave the 
people little. During Chávez’s presidency, corruption thrived, and now Venezuela needs a 
specialized anti-corruption strategy. Chapter IV, therefore, provides analysis over anti-
corruption by examining the four primary anti-corruption schools of thought and specific 
societal factors of culture, political will, and international integration to establish a 
foundation for a possible anti-corruption strategy for Venezuela. Based on Venezuela’s 
societal factors, state-center anti-corruption theory corresponds with Venezuela and 
provides the tools to combat the specific blend of corruption that exist after 17 years of 
Chávismo politics, in the hopes to provide relief to Venezuelan citizens.  
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A. FOUR ANTI-CORRUPTION SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
What does anti-corruption mean and how can Venezuelan citizens help? Anti-
corruption strategy, according to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, is meant to 
provide assistance by building transparent and accountable systems for those in power, 
while empowering civil society and the media to ensure an overall integrity and ethics 
and challenge the factors that facilitate corruption.410 Analysts divide anti-corruption into 
four schools of thought or theoretical approaches: universalistic, state-center, society-
centric, and critical. Table 1 provides a description of each principle. While all four are 
valuable, state-center provides the highest likelihood of incorporating both civil society 
and state institutions, a critical component for a Venezuelan anti-corruption plan. 
Table 1.   Summary of Anti-Corruption Program Foundations411 
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State-center theory involves both state and civil society in preventing corruption. 
The theory formulates anti-corruption by evaluating corruption’s causes at the individual 
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level, considering the human element as well as state characteristics.412 Decision-makers 
that use state-center can analyze corruption at an individual level rather than a three 
thousand level view of the problem. Focusing on corruption at the individual level also 
allows for analysis on the drivers or opportunities that exist for individuals to conduct 
corrupt operations. The ultimate intention of state-center theory focuses on “increasing 
accountability and transparency in public sector processes and services-ultimately with 
the aim of reducing political patronage,”413 ideal for Venezuela. Accountability and 
transparency increases by observing the procedures and actors’ motivations to conduct 
corrupt practices. That specific focus in Venezuela allows an analysis of the factors 
established from the last 17 years of Chávismo patronage policies in order to discover the 
gaps in accountability and transparency mechanisms. A state-center anti-corruption 
strategy also allows decision-makers to remedy the failure of Chávismo anti-corruption 
policies. 
In order to create a specialized anti-corruption strategy in Venezuela, this thesis 
considers two broad categories of corruption, Principal-agent and collective action. 
Principal-agent corruption compartmentalizes victims and offender while collective 
action lumps everyone together as culpable. Venezuela’s corruption exhibits a mix of 
both categories through its clear actors of corrupt practices and the systematic web of 
corrupt practices that subsist throughout the state. 
B. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  
Principal-Agent corruption theory distinguishes responsibilities between principal 
and agents, where corrupt agents create victims, or principals. The agents accomplish 
corrupt operations for their personal gain. Information asymmetry provides a means for 
agents to take advantage of principals. Information asymmetry refers to the abundance or 
enhanced knowledge that agents have over principals.414 The knowledge of loopholes in 
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laws, for example, could result in personal gains for agents and allows them to conduct 
corrupt operations un-be-announce to the principal. Without access to that information, 
the principals face a difficult challenge in demanding accountability from the agent.  
Anti-corruption mechanisms to combat principal-agent corruption remove the 
advantage of the agents to conduct corrupt practices. In Venezuela, principal-agent 
corruption appears in social development projects, such as where military officers engage 
in “false invoicing and the signing of contracts with nonexistent suppliers.”415 Chávez 
reformed the military to have a social development mission that reports directly to the 
president.416 The president’s direct control removed the National Assembly’s power to 
accomplish oversight and accountability,417 which gave the armed forces a safe haven to 
accomplish corrupt practices uncontested. In this case, the military, as the agents, gain the 
ability to operate in secret, diverting resources from the missions, while the citizens, as 
the principals, lose millions in needed relief. By restoring military oversight to an 
external institution, Venezuela can reduce principal-agent corruption. 
C. COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Also viewed as systemic corruption, collective-action identifies everyone as both 
victims and offenders, which complicates anti-corruption methods considerably. 
According to Alina Rocha Menocal et al., “all stakeholders [are] self-maximisers, and the 
way they behave to maximize their interests is highly dependent on shared expectations 
about the behavior of others.”418 A major factor in collective-action corruption involves 
the magnitude of the corruption, where the more interwoven it becomes within a society, 
the more citizens view it as a part of their state and do little to apply pressure to reduce 
the practices. Thus, systemic corruption survives in a state because the people choose not 
to curb it. Anna Persson et.al, claims that corruption, in collective-action situations, 
subsists in the state and that citizens’ skepticism in the system to curb it results in no 
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reason to refrain from participating in corrupt operations.419 Systematic corruption 
overwhelms state institutions, while short-term gains provoke citizens to prolong corrupt 
practices.  
The way collective-action corruption subsists in Venezuela involves the lack of 
accountability and oversight. Venezuela’s institutions, like the communal councils, for 
example, allow individuals to conduct corrupt practices with no oversight or 
accountability mechanisms in place. The communal councils demonstrate principal-agent 
corruption with communal members as agents and the citizens as the principals. For 
example, an auto mechanic, Juan Freire, reported that money that the communal councils 
received was diverted for non-community projects (i.e., personal expenses and homes for 
family members).420 Communal councils also show systematic corruption, where the 
communities have no incentive to stopping corrupt practices because of the benefits 
received. For example, Jesus Diaz, a council member, was ousted due to his inefficient 
efforts to accomplish home construction projects in Saman Mocho.421 Diaz claimed that 
the delays resulted from the contractor asking to transfer funds into his personal account, 
an illegal practice that Diaz refused to do.422 Also, Diaz argued that the construction 
company was inefficient, with houses left incomplete that resulted in citizens finishing 
the job.423 During the investigation into those claims, the council received additional 
funding for more houses, to include Diaz’s daughter’s house.424 Diaz reversed his stance 
against the project claiming that, “It is a demonstration that the people can build 
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homes.”425 The corrupt practice of the council became nuance once the key objectors 
were appeased, as was the case with Diaz’s daughter receiving her new home and his 
retraction. The act of bystanders knowing that corruption occur and not apply pressure on 
decision-makers to remedy the issue results in collective-action corruption.  
Communal councils also have strong patrimonial ties with the government, and, 
as a result, a major controversy with them involves their lack of oversight. Council 
spending operates in secret and with no accountability. Secrecy of the councils’ 
operations occurs through what Catia la Mar reports as the lack of “official accounting of 
how community-support funds are spent,” with the Autonomous National Fund for 
Community Councils (SAFONACC), who has responsibility for the councils, having “no 
centralized system to track outlays or follow-up on projects.”426 The blending of the two 
types of corruption makes it difficult to incorporate a one-size-fits-all solution that thrives 
on a clear perpetrator and victim dichotomy. State center anti-corruption solutions, as a 
result, can provide an individual level analysis to mitigate the state’s dual corruption type 
situation.  
Due to the complexity of Venezuela’s unique corruption situation, anti-corruption 
strategy can be three-pronged, based on three societal sources of support: cultural 
context, political will, and international integration. The three societal categories uncover 
the effects of corruption within the state and the reasons for corruption’s sustainability. 
Also, the three categories provide the means for policy makers to shape anti-corruption 
mechanisms in order to incorporate the Venezuelan citizen. Venezuelans can gain a 
position in their state to hold those that have power and influence accountable.  
D. CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Cultural corruption analysis allows scholars to gain insight on the effects of 
corruption within a state: how do members of the society view corrupt practices? Does 
the corrupt person’s relativity to the citizen affect their perception of corruption? Cultural 
                                                 




context explains how corruption can survive within a society or affect their personal 
evaluation of what corruption means. Scholars studying culture can analyze the effects of 
corruption at the individual level, a key element of state-center strategies.  
Corruption and culture analysis uses Geert Hofstede’s 1980s work with national 
cultural dimensions as their bedrock. Culture dimensions allow for a focus on specific 
cultural factors that correspond better with anti-corruption methods’ effectiveness at 
reducing corruption. Hofstede established four dimensions of national culture: power 
distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-
femininity.427 A fifth dimension, long-short-term orientation, was added in 1991 based 
on Michael Bond’s Confucian Work Dynamism dimension;428 however, corruption and 
culture scholars omit the fifth dimension due to its incompatibility with corruption.429 
For this thesis, the focus will follow suit with the four dimensions. Based on Hofstede’s 
four cultural dimensions, Venezuela has a high-power distance, collectivist, high-
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity profile.430 The four cultural dimensions provide 
an explanation on why corruption manifests and remains within Venezuelan society.  
Power distance describes the inequality between citizens’ and leaders’ behaviors. 
Hofstede defines power distance as the expectation of subordinates understanding and 
consent that power is not equal.431 In terms of corruption, the knowledge and acceptance 
of inequality becomes exploited by leadership for their own personal gain through tools 
like paternalism. Husted claims that countries with high power distance use paternalism 
to create citizen dependence onto leaders.432 The dependence relationship from citizen to 
leader maintains a level of culpability that prevents citizens from voicing opposition. The 
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relationships act as a means to bribe citizens into accepting corrupt practices. 
Venezuela’s social programs created a paternalist relationship where the poor depends on 
the state in order to elevate their status.433 This form of corruption in high power distance 
cultures evolves into “favoritism and nepotism.”434 Subordinates in high power distance 
relationships accept that their leaders engage in corrupt activities as a part of doing 
business and can eventually seek their own benefits from not disturbing the status quo. 
Anti-corruption methods in high power distance cultures would need to establish a 
culture of anti-corruption where leaders engage in curbing corruption while 
simultaneously empower citizens to hold their leaders accountable, with protections such 
as whistleblower laws and non-retribution securities. 
Individualism-collectivism aspect analyzes decision-making influences. Hofstede 
defined the concept as decisions’ influence deriving from either the individual or the 
members of their own inner circle.435 Husted identifies collectivism as the in-group’s 
influence on tolerating corruption within the concept of “amoral familism.”436 Amoral 
familism, according to Edward Banfield, is present in “a culture that is deficient in 
communitarian values but fosters familial ties.”437 Thus, corruption enters a society 
because the lack of “communitarian values” allows individuals to commit and tolerate 
corrupt practices to better themselves and family members. Communitarian values 
influence individuals to keep the rule of law in order to maintain stability; however, when 
familial values replace communitarian values, then the motivation to maintain rules of 
law that counter family values does not happen. In Venezuela, a collectivist society, in-
group familial influences matter. Raúl González Fabre describes familism in Venezuela 
as the driving force toward loyalty in “primary relationships” with feelings of shame 
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from in-group members the most damaging to Venezuelans.438 As a result, collectivist 
societies experience uneven applications of law between the in-group and out-group, 
which undermines confidence in the objective application of rule of law.  
Masculinity-Femininity refers to sources of success in life, which shapes the types 
of punishment or retributions created in anti-corruption strategies. For masculinity 
societies, the source of success center on material possessions, while in femininity 
societies, source of success stems from quality of life gains. Venezuela, as a high 
masculine society, values actions that involve “highly success [angled], driven, 
competitive, and status-oriented”439 characteristics. The masculinity dimension identifies 
society’s priority of achieving success in their personal lives with adjustments based on 
other dimensions, like collectivism. Venezuela, as a masculine, collectivistic society, 
results in competition “directed towards members of the out-groups, not towards those 
who are perceived as members of your own in-group.”440 This offers evidence as to why, 
in Venezuela’s collectivist masculine society, the “us versus them” rhetoric in Chávez’s 
speeches resonates well with Venezuelans, because they already view themselves in those 
categories. Anti-corruption techniques can consider elements of financial sanctions and 
in-group perceptions in order to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms 
within Venezuelan society. 
Uncertainty Avoidance is a cultural factor that describes a society’s anxiety of the 
unknown that anti-corruption can consider in order to soothe those apprehensions. 
Hofstede defines uncertainty avoidance as a society’s fear of the unknown.441 Husted 
claims that corruption, in relation to uncertainty avoidance, acts as a tool to assure 
certainty.442 Perception of corruption under the lens of uncertainty avoidance makes a 
difference simply because a citizen views corruption as a trade-off to anxiety of the 
unknown. High uncertainty avoidance societies typically create strict laws to attempt to 
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curb the uncertainty, but those laws are typically ignored because it depends on how the 
“in-group feels the rules are applicable to their members and in the decision of power 
holders who make their own rules.”443 Risk avoidance and the level of impunity are 
typical tools of high uncertainty avoidance states as well as their citizens’ willingness to 
engage in corrupt practices. Uncertainty raises anxiety among its citizens, and allows 
corruption to act as a means to lower the anxiety regardless of any moral objection. 
Venezuelans risk assessment of the situation tends to side more toward the acceptance of 
corrupt practices in order to secure social development assistance. 
E. POLITICAL WILL 
Political will in anti-corruption determines the level of real initiative to curb 
corruption among the political elites. Political will means the desire from the players of a 
political system (i.e., ruling elites) toward a particular action or priority. The ability to 
gain support among the political elite ensures legitimate anti-corruption reforms. 
Menocal et al., notes that political will is crucial, specifically with Civil Society 
organization’s (CSO) anti-corruption methods, which rely on the support of the political 
actors to provide strength behind their anti-corruption plans as well as allow the CSOs 
freedom to build relationships between the state and citizens.444 Political support fuels 
anti-corruption mechanisms to strengthen its ability to operate within the most corrupt 
countries.445 Political will shapes anti-corruption strategies to ensure their legitimate 
support and resources.  
Building political will within anti-corruption strategies can face challenges within 
polarized societies, as in the case of Venezuela. During the height of Hugo Chávez’s 
presidency, his strong rhetoric created divisions within society and formed Chavistas, a 
subset of society that included the majority of the poor, military, and others who support 
the government. After the 2002 failed coup attempt and strikes, societal division made 
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political will difficult to influence. Chavistas were receiving rewards for their loyalty, 
through lucrative positions.446 The Chavista patronage networks created a motivation for 
a large portion of society to sustain the corrupt practices rather than push political elites 
to curb it.447 Protests and civil unrest in 2014 had Chavistas mobilized to counter 
opposition forces448 fracturing political will further into two distinct camps, Pro-
Government and Anti-Government. The opposition’s (anti-government) success in the 
December 6, 2015 legislative elections resulted in the opposition party gaining seats in 
the Asamblea Nacional.449 A renewed attempt to build political will toward curbing 
corruption gained momentum.  
While the current situation in Venezuela is signaling toward building political will 
among the elites, Chávismo anti-corruption policies show the weak foundation of 
political will implementation to date. According to Brinkerhoff, “political will is a 
dynamic phenomenon, subject to shifts and modulations over time in the face of changing 
circumstances and events.”450 With that premise, citizen’s perception of corruption as a 
non-issue within shallow anti-corruption initiatives identifies a lack of political will. The 
political will shift, that Brinkerhoff refers to, manifests within the growing dissatisfaction 
toward Maduro’s administration and the new strength of the opposition. In order to 
understand how to seize this momentum to build political will requires an analysis of 
Venezuela’s political will toward anti-corruption. This thesis uses Brinkerhoff’s analysis 
of political will that breaks it down into five characteristics: locus of initiative, degree of 
analytical rigor, mobilization of constituencies of stakeholders, application of credible 
sanctions, and continuity of effort,451 so as to gain a better perspective of Venezuela’s 
political will.  
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Locus of initiative refers to the desire to deal with corruption. Brinkerhoff claims 
that this characteristic highlights where the desire comes from: the state or the outside, 
like international actors. Brinkerhoff explains how states that show their own initiative to 
create anti-corruption strategies show higher levels of political will versus states that have 
anti-corruption strategies imposed or initiated by external actors, which involves creating 
buy-in of the state.452 External actors’ motives are constantly in question for sincerity and 
as a result require proof of legitimacy. Venezuela’s strong anti-liberal, anti-U.S. rhetoric 
during the past 17 years causes citizens to question the ulterior motives of outside anti-
corruption policies. Coupled with Venezuela’s in-group collectivist nature, any policies 
from the “out-group” are received with skepticism. Drivers of anti-corruption methods 
must determine the level of commitment either inherent or missing within the political 
system and adjust accordingly. Based on those societal attributes, Venezuelan citizens as 
part of anti-corruption solutions provide an acceptance of proposed anti-corruption 
strategies. 
Degree of analytical rigor describes the amount of effort behind dealing with 
corruption. High levels of analytical rigor manifest in the commitment of actors to find 
appropriate anti-corruption mechanisms that tackle the actual problems affecting the 
state. The opposite, low degrees of analytical rigor, has anti-corruption mechanisms that 
break into the surface level effects of corruption.453 In Venezuela, a low degree of 
analytical rigor is apparent in previous anti-corruption initiatives. For example, Leslie 
Gates points specifically to political interference in anti-corruption methods as a main 
factor in their inefficiency to investigate and curb corruption among the higher tiers of 
government.454 The President’s micromanaging of anti-corruption makes the policies a 
façade of the state’s commitment to curbing corruption and lack true transparency.  
Mobilization of support involves how anti-corruption mechanisms incorporate the 
public. Anti-corruption mechanism obtains verification of mobilization of support by 
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asking: does the anti-corruption mechanisms involve the entire state and considers 
everyone’s part in the process?455 Also, are progress reports on effectiveness 
publicized?456 Levels of political will come through in the ability of anti-corruption 
mechanisms incorporation of civil society to hold their leaders accountable. The more 
civil society becomes excluded in the anti-corruption process, the less likely pressure will 
exist among political elites to ensure anti-corruption benchmarks are being met. 
Venezuela’s secretive approach to providing transparency shows the current lack of 
political will to include civil society into effective anti-corruption strategies. A substantial 
marketing campaign as well as reporting mechanisms can serve as examples to include 
all major stakeholders. The Venezuelan population desire for anti-corruption relief still 
needs their inclusion within the anti-corruption process.  
Application of credible sanctions analyzes the incentives and punishments in anti-
corruption reform plans. Brinkerhoff illustrates credible sanctions as “restructured 
principal-agent relationships, provide positive incentives for compliance institutions, 
along with rehabilitation efforts.”457 Anti-corruption mechanisms require components 
that ensure corruption is condemned and mitigated. Political will with this factor involves 
the motivation of political elites to allow for the creation of credible sanctions that ensure 
the equitable enforcement of anti-corruption. Thus, Venezuela’s inability to enact 
credible sanctions comes in large part from the president’s strong influence in 
institutions. Gates describes that “the Chávez government…[comptroller] office has been 
held by individuals who have maintained a much lower profile politically and has been 
less willing to bring to light irregularities in the [Chávez] government,” as well as the 
attorney general losing political independence, creating an inability to bring forward 
corruption cases toward Chavistas.458 The lack of confidence to deliver punishment 
creates an unsafe environment for citizens to disclose corrupt actions. Political will 
weakens if laws to punish offenders do not get upheld. Also, political will involves the 
                                                 
455 Brinkerhoff, “Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts,” 243. 
456 Ibid.. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Gates, “The Politics of Corruption in Venezuela,” 13. 
 94 
citizens’ incentive to promote a culture of transparency and accountability and the 
assurance that the justice system will protect them. 
The final characteristic, continuity of effort, identifies the available resources and 
effort committed in the long-term, to anti-corruption mechanisms. Resources means both 
the fiscal and human capital invested into programs. Political will is determined through 
this characteristic by what planning has been placed in the allocation and continuity of 
resources within the anti-corruption system.459 Anti-corruption policies become 
insufficient without the analytical tools to measure effectiveness and a plan to ensure the 
correct resources are allocated and sustainable. The more investment from the state into 
those mechanism shows strong political will in meaningful anti-corruption efforts. 
The environmental factors of a state influence political will and shapes anti-
corruption methods. Brinkerhoff identifies six environmental factors that could affect 
political will: regime type; social, political, and economic stability; extent and nature of 
corruption; vested interests; civil society and the private sector; and donor-government 
relations.460 These environmental factors can threaten decision-makers ability to obtain 
political will. Environment factors give the context for the level of political will in a 
society. Thus, Brinkerhoff’s model incorporates “the characteristics of political will and 
environmental factors to assess the presence or absence of political will, evaluate political 
will’s sincerity, and the longevity of political will.”461 The environmental factors affect 
the amount of political will elites possess because they act as drivers that can influence 
decision-making. 
Venezuela’s environmental factors show how Chávismo’s politics shaped the 
political will among decision-makers to force substantial reforms in curbing corruption. 
For example, Chávismo’s state capture oil policy involved a four-point goal: “move oil 
policy to the Energy Ministry, improve governments’ income from oil revenue towards 
taxing royalties, strengthen OPEC and respect their quotas, and curtail new private 
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investment.”462 The reforms that Chávismo policies created in order to meet those goals 
involved a restructure of PDVSA and Citgo leadership. This reform, in particular, 
ultimately led to incorporating unqualified Chavistas into those leadership positions to 
ensure loyalty, resulting in the politicization of the state’s most lucrative enterprise.463 
Gates concludes that this action by the Venezuelan government, “contributed to the 
public’s greater passivity regarding corruption as a political issue.”464 The reason for the 
citizens’ passivity was because the power projection of the President removed potential 
challengers of the government from positions of influence. Thus, Chávismo policies 
weaken political will in Venezuela because it created an environment where loyalty 
trounces merit, making it difficult to demand anti-corruption policies if job security 
becomes challenged. The goal with state center anti-corruption mechanisms in Venezuela 
ultimately comprises in increasing political will within all sectors of Venezuelan society. 
F. INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The final societal factor, international integration, refers to the inclusion of external 
players within an anti-corruption mechanism that shapes global norms about corruption. 
Corruption’s impact extends beyond the borders of a nation. International actors, in both 
economic and political systems, can mold anti-corruption mechanisms. Scholars began to 
identify that corruption could have the potential to damage economic institutions and 
“redirect and subvert policy reforms.”465 The interest of the international community 
toward curbing corruption grew exponentially with the realization of the global impacts on 
corruption. International organizations (IOs) shifted toward endorsing transparency in 
political systems as well as create anti-corruption campaigns as stipulations in receiving 
aid.466 The link between global economic strength and strong governance behooved the 
international community to make corruption an international issue.  
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The neoliberal reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), otherwise 
known as the Washington Consensus, promote anti-corruption policies as conditions for 
their assistance. According to the IMF factsheet, “the IMF places great emphasis on 
promoting good governance when providing: policy advice, financial support, and 
technical assistance to its member countries … [and] works with its member countries 
to… combat corruption.”467 Several countries rejected the Washington Consensus, 
including Chávez’s Venezuela, because of its debilitating short-term effects from 
required austerity measures. The strong rhetoric of Chávez created an anti-liberal, anti-
U.S. position, making support from agencies, like the World Bank and IMF, difficult. 
Rather, Chávismo’s aims were to spread the Bolivarian Revolution’s priorities 
throughout the region in their security and oil alliances (ALBA and Petrocaribe) resulting 
in an outsourcing of patronage networks rather than accept assistance from international 
organizations. 
Anti-corruption became a regional issue in Latin America with Venezuela playing 
its part in international conventions. Before Chávez, in terms of international anti-
corruption programs, Venezuela participated in OAS and OECD conventions. Venezuela 
also hosted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACC) on March 29, 
1996 in Caracas.468 Once Chávez entered office in 1998, participation in these programs 
changed. According to Leslie Gates, in 2006, “Venezuela’s Comptroller denied the 
Organization of American States permission to publish a report by Transparencía 
Venezuela that was critical of the government in its follow-up report to the IACC.”469 
Chávez described these international commissions as tools of the imperial U.S. and 
counter to the Bolivarian Revolution. The argument for international integration remains 
that countries become ultimately exposed to international norms and anti-corruption 
practices and provides motivation against participating in corrupt practices.  
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International integration hinges on the goal to promote transparency and 
accountability to countries based on promoting an international norm of anti-corruption. 
According to Sandholtz and Gray, transnational activities are evidence of the existence of 
international norms.470 Groups like Transparency International, The World Bank, IMF, 
United Nations’ General Assembly, as well as regional international organizations (IOs) 
like OAS and OECD, attempt to join forces to handle corruption through that principal of 
international norms. According to Sandholtz and Gray, the International Anti Corruption 
Conference (IACC) combined the efforts of multiple IOs to create a more cohesive 
system.471 Venezuela joined that convention, as mention previously, with the costs of 
corruption beginning to tip the scale within the society and internationally. Unfortunately, 
Chávez’s strong rhetoric outweighed the potential benefits from IOs and other NGO 
groups that could provide relief to Venezuela’s current crisis. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Anti-corruption strategy analyzes corrupt actions influence among a state and 
develops mechanisms to provide relief. Anti-corruption has four theoretical categories, 
universalistic, state-center, society-centric, and critical school. The players in anti-
corruption strategies dictate the differences among the schools of thought and provide 
decision-makers with a method to incorporate the most appropriate means, as well as 
analyze corruption that exists within the state. Corruption divided into two broad 
categories, principal-agent and collective-action (or systematic), delineates corrupt 
practices that has distinct actors (principal-agent) and the culpability of all members of 
society within corruption (collective action).  
Anti-corruption also requires analysis of societal factors that influence corruption 
as well as anti-corruption mechanisms. This chapter specifically focused on culture, 
political will, and international integration in order to shape the societal makeup of 
Venezuela and how those factors affect corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms. Due 
                                                 
470 Wayne Sandholtz and Mark M. Gray, “International Integration and National Corruption,” 
International Organization 57, no. 4 (September 2003): 761, doi:10.1017/S0020818303574045. 
471 Sandholtz and Gray, “International Integration and National Corruption.” 
 98 
to Venezuela’s current political and economic crisis, corruption became too costly to 
ignore, and the current societal division between the Chavistas and the opposition 
gridlock attempts to political solutions. A possible solution for Venezuela could be the 
use of state center anti-corruption mechanisms that tackles Venezuela’s societal factors. 
Corruption has both systematic and principal-agent elements that allow a state-center 
anti-corruption strategy to tackle corruption on an individual level, focusing on the state 
actors as well as the institutional frameworks that facilitate corruption. The cultural 
context of Venezuela, fragile level of political will, and apprehension toward 
international inclusion lends more toward state-center theory of anti-corruption, because 
it provides decision makers with the opportunity to incorporate societal elements to create 
domestic policies that build political will and include civil society. The Bolivarian 
Revolution’s failure toward curbing corruption and the renewed resolve of Venezuelan 
citizens provides an opportunity for anti-corruption strategy that goes beyond a one-size-
fits-all policy and gains buy-in from the Venezuelan citizen. 
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V. POTENTIAL VENEZUELAN ANTI-CORRUPTION 
SOLUTIONS 
Venezuela suffers from 17 years of mismanagement under Chávez’s policies that 
resulting in a complex corruption network of patronage relationships and black markets. 
Venezuela has an unique corrupt situation that has the state ensuring loyalty through 
patronage networks, while, simultaneously, citizens create black markets that affect the 
poorest members of society at a lucrative profit for the upper and middle classes. Food 
shortages and hyper-inflation has spiraled Venezuelan society into a dramatic economic 
crisis, coupled with rising homicide rates and a polarized society, providing the spark for 
civil unrest. Protests demand Maduro’s resignation and a relief from the crisis. 
Venezuela, as a result, is primed for intervention to remedy corruption. With the success 
of the opposition in 2015, the government has an opportunity to incorporate solutions to 
curb corruption and deliver relief to Venezuelan citizens. Figure 1 shows the new 
strength of the opposition party in blue versus the red Chavistas or PSUV party.  
 
Figure 1.  Party Vote Country Level Map.472 
This thesis examined the factors that facilitated the rise in corruption during 
Chávez’s presidency in order to determine possible remedies to curtail further 
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intensification and violence. Chapter IV explored anti-corruption theories along with 
Venezuela’s societal factors in order to determine a more tailored anti-corruption 
solution. With the foundation established, Chapter V applies state-center principles 
through modifications that focus on the state as the driver of policy reform, while 
working to rebuild civil society participation and political will. This chapter divides 
reforms into three segments of society: economy, political system, and social 
accountability, providing a roadmap of possible options for the Venezuelan government, 
while also comparing the proposed anti-corruption strategies with how similar strategies 
have worked in Brazil and Mexico. The possible solutions that this thesis proposes for 
Venezuela comprise of market-friendly, socially democratic economic reforms, political 
reforms to lessen presidential power, and social accountability reforms to strengthen civil 
institutions, like the media and security apparatus, through state-center anti-corruption 
policies within a context of Venezuelan cultural and political will.  
A. ECONOMY: MARKET-FRIENDLY SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REFORMS 
Mismanagement of the economy through Cháveznomics could be relieved by a 
shift toward a market-friendly social democracy model that involves more privatization, 
foreign investment, and an avenue to incorporate anti-corruption mechanisms. The issue 
of wealth inequality and poverty lends itself to incorporate economic models that target 
these issues but provide a stronger oversight than was seen through populist economic 
models, like Cháveznomics. Market-friendly policies can provide avenues to increase 
protections for the poor, while still addressing issues of weak governance.473 These 
reforms may also provide the assistance to tackle rising poverty rates in a more efficient 
manner. Market-friendly social democracy examples in Latin America included a three-
pronged system: consolidated market reforms, targeted public spending, and adherence to 
democratic norms and procedures.474 These reforms would allow Venezuela to tackle the 
most pressing issues for its population, such as inflation and poverty, while promoting 
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anti-corruption mechanisms like checks and balances and allowing citizens access to the 
political system.475 Table 2 illustrates the proposed reforms for Venezuela. Market-
friendly social democracy allows for a possible transition away from the Cháveznomics 
method of dominating the markets.  
Table 2.   Market-Friendly Social Democratic Economic Reforms 
Reform State Control 
of Economy  
Reform price, capital, 
and currency controls 
Incorporate Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAI) 
 
Alberto Fishlow’s 2013 recommendations of market-friendly social democracy 
draw parallels from Mexico’s actions to incorporate similar reforms. Fishlow says 
Venezuela should accomplish “de-nationalization, deficit containment, and a fresh start 
with foreign oil companies,”476 in order to create an effective market-friendly social 
democracy. Mexico provides an example of this transition in 2014, with Fishlow 
describing how most of the state’s monopolies were privatized, social spending targeted 
to replace political patronage, and the economy was diversified.477 Venezuela could 
attempt Mexico’s approach, especially diversifying the economy to lessen oil 
dependence.  
Another element of Mexico’s market-friendly social democratic reforms that 
Venezuela could attempt involves foreign investment. Cháveznomics removed the 
inclusion of foreign oil companies, discouraging foreign investment. The history of the 
U.S. foreign oil companies became symbolic as the tools of the imperial U.S. sabotaging 
Venezuela, similar to Mexico. Venezuela did not do away with foreign investment 
altogether, though, but engaged with China, Vietnam, and Belarus.478 Despite the ability 
to gain capital from these states, Jorge Piñon argues that those states cannot substitute the 
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technological expertise required.479 Venezuelans could possibly consider reevaluating 
current foreign investment with more beneficial partners that can provide the technical 
expertise. Mexico, like Venezuela, shares the same contested history over foreign 
investment; however, Aaron Menenberg describes that in Mexico what changed was the 
political will in political party elites to reevaluate their attitudes toward foreign 
investment.480 In order to follow Mexico’s trajectory, Venezuela would also have to 
rebuild political will in order to encourage more useful foreign investment.  
1. Presidential Control Reforms 
Presidential power within the economy provides challenges to incorporate 
Fishlow’s recommendation to de-nationalize state industries. According to Venezuela’s 
Bolivarian Constitution, article 236, the president has the power to “administer the 
national public treasury, negotiate national loans, and order extraordinary budget items in 
addition to the budget.”481 Article 236 allowed Chávez to increase Venezuela’s over-
dependence on oil, by regulating PDVSA as his piggy bank for social development 
projects. Other components to presidential powers include decree powers. The decree 
powers afforded Chávez the ability to incorporate major socialist initiatives with virtually 
no opposition. After the economy took a dip in 2008, the following reforms were pushed 
by decree: “market regulation and outright expropriation of private businesses.”482 These 
reforms strengthen state control to gain more businesses like telecommunications and 
industrial centers,483 further enlarging his fiscal resources to fund more projects. A 
possible solution involves constitutional amendments over presidential powers to lessen 
the control of the economy. More accountability mechanisms would be incorporated to 
ensure a check on presidential power to lessen the use of these industries as presidential 
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piggy banks, as well as decentralization of powers. This would establish a more even-
handed political environment for the National Assembly to pass stronger property rights 
to lay the foundation for future de-nationalization of several industries seized by 
Cháveznomics policies and curb the president’s ability to enlarge their revenue streams.  
Other economic reforms include restructuring social development programs that 
are currently unsustainable due to the high cost of government spending and filled with 
corrupt operations. A decrease in government spending, which increased by 137% in 
2008,484 is necessary considering the difficulties in the state to maintain its current rates. 
Market-social democratic reforms can incorporate more targeted social development 
projects by diminishing Cháveznomics policies that created complex patronage networks 
(through misiones) that permitted Chavistas to stay in power. In order to dismantle the 
government’s patronage networks involve more targeted development programs that 
remove the motivations of the state to use them as vote-buying mechanisms. In order to 
dismantle those networks, social development projects can develop more long-term 
mechanisms to lessen the population’s dependency on the state while lessen state costs. 
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia attempted such an approach by incorporating both short-term and 
long-term components. The program provided cash handouts to families with children 
under the stipulation that the children attended school.485 This program incorporated 
short-term aid in cash handouts to families with the end result of long-term gains in 
assisting generations get out of poverty through education. Stipulations to aid provide the 
opportunities to the most disadvantage segments of a population to better their situations 
and lessen their dependence. Restructuring Venezuela’s misiones to create long-term 
initiatives in order to provide a stopgap to reverse inter-generational poverty.  
2. Price, Capital, and Currency Control Reforms 
Chávez, in an attempt to assist the poor, implemented price controls in goods and 
currencies, allowing for corrupt parallel institutions to disrupt the state’s economy. Price 
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controls create artificial prices on basic goods to keep them inexpensive for citizens. The 
problem with the government price controls results in a demand and supply imbalance. 
Suppliers lost the incentive to provide goods due to their low profit and resulted in selling 
their goods to smugglers at a higher price.486 Venezuelan suppliers are engaging in this 
practice with smugglers selling the goods to neighboring Colombia or in the Venezuelan 
black market for a higher profit.487 The creation of a lucrative parallel black market 
institution occurs and exacerbates the food shortages, forcing even the most law-abiding 
citizens to participate in corruption. Figure 2 illustrates the issue of the scarcity in 
consumer products 
 
Figure 2.  Venezuela Scarcity Index In Stores488 
Currency and capital controls created a foreign exchange black market that, along 
with price controls on goods, made corruption widespread throughout society. Chávez 
created a currency system that strengthens the bolívar to “prevent the flight of capital.”489 
                                                 
486 “The 4 Most Urgent Reforms for Venezuela’s New Congress,” PanAm Post, January 4, 2016, 
https://panampost.com/valerie-marsman/2016/01/04/the-4-most-urgent-reforms-for-venezuelas-new-
congress/. 
487 “Venezuela’s Economic Crisis Explained,” YouTube video, 11:15, Posted by “Caspian Report,” 
March 13, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OrfM5UD-Azk. 
488 Source: Steve Hanke, “Venezuela’s Playbook: The Communist Manifesto,” Financial Sense, 
December 13, 2013, http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/steve-hanke/venezuela-playbook-
communist-manifesto. 
489 “The 4 Most Urgent Reforms for Venezuela’s New Congress.” 
 105 
The controls implemented a fix exchange rate, where the government controlled how 
much foreign currency could be purchased and how much could leave the country. A 
black market formed from loopholes in the policy. In the black market, a citizen can gain 
a higher exchange rate than the government’s for dollars, which results in citizens 
exploiting loopholes in order to purchase dollars at a cheap rate and sell them within the 
black market for major profits.490 This practice creates an informal economy that the 
state is unable to tax, losing millions in potential tax revenues.491 The control policies 
further the desire to engage in corrupt practices with goods being smuggled and sold in 
Colombia. The goods are than purchased in U.S. dollars with smugglers returning to 
exchange them back to bolivars in the black market rate resulting in a lucrative profit.492 
This black market affects the population disproportionately because the upper and middle 
class are the only ones with access to the black market to gain a profit, leaving the lower 
class reeling from the food shortages and high inflation that the informal economy 
creates. 
Attempts to remove black market incentives involve policies that could further 
plunge the economy into a deeper crisis. Experts like Nelson Merentes, the 2013 finance 
minister, attempted more pragmatic reforms, such as opening up the foreign exchange 
market and devaluing the bolívar to normal global rates.493 The reforms expose the 
potential to higher inflation that could agitate the public enough to generate another 
Caracazo riot. Thus, this fear drove the government to maintain current policies and 
remove him (Merentes) from office.494 While potentially ruinous, removing price 
controls to allow for the return to current market levels could reshape the economic 
model of Cháveznomics and remove the bubble of exchange rates. 
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3. Supreme Audit Institutions 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) provides a possible anti-corruption mechanism 
that agrees with market friendly social democratic reforms. According to Menocal et.al., 
SAIs are to perform audits of public funds to ensure projects are meeting the intent 
responsibly with transparent communication to the public.495 Figure 3 establishes a visual 
depiction of the institution. 
 
Figure 3.  The Proposed Structure of the Supreme Audit Institution 
Framework496 
SAIs use standard (regulatory) and specialized (forensic) audits in order to 
analyze institutions’ budgets. Menocal et.al., identifies the difference of the two forms of 
audits being the depth of focus and that specialized audits are “more effective at detecting 
and reducing corruption, especially if accompanied with punitive sanctions.”497 The 
secretive nature of Venezuela’s financial practices requires objective audits through 
autonomous independent organizations. Hence, the removal of political interference 
through amendments strengthens SAIs effectiveness to provide oversight on public funds 
along with market-friendly social democratic reforms, ensuring anti-corruption 
effectiveness in Venezuela. 
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B. POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Venezuela’s populist political system, Chávismo, concentrates power to the 
executive, where reforms can provide an opportunity to incorporate strong transparency 
and accountability mechanisms. In order for Chávez and Maduro to remain in power over 
the last 17 years, Chávismo policies required the use of patronage networks. The 
president’s unrivaled strength resulted in the political system relating more with 
authoritarianism than democracy. This observation, according to the IEP’s Peace and 
Corruption 2015 report, identifies Venezuela as a hybrid regime, which are authoritarian 
with some democratic processes.498 A hybrid regime navigates as a democracy without 
following a truly democratic approach. Table 3 notes strategies such as decentralization 
of presidential power could disseminate that influence from the president and gain 
autonomy for local politicians. Communal councils were an attempt of Chávismo’s 
decentralization efforts that resulted in becoming extensions of Chávez’s influence at the 
local levels. Their power as an informal institution challenge municipal governments and 
introduce patronage networks from the president to the councils, which further increases 
the president’s power in the lowest levels of politics.  
Table 3.   Political Reforms 
Decentralization Institutional Reform Public Financial Management (PFM) 
 
1. Institutional Reforms: Communal Councils 
To curb the political patronage of communal councils, Venezuela can reform the 
operational control of the councils and include oversight mechanisms. Oversight 
mechanisms can monitor public funds, which have been identified as a major issue 
among the councils’ operations. Oversight mechanisms require a reworking of the 
organizational structure to make the councils accountable to municipal officials and 
remove their direct link to the president. For this to occur, councils would fall under the 
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jurisdiction of municipalities’ oversight mechanisms to ensure funds are responsibility 
used. For example, Chávez used the informal institutions to directly fund pro-government 
supporters in the process of subverting opposition mayors.499 Communal councils’ 
budgets received an increase from $1 Billion in 2006 to $5 billion in 2007500 that came 
directly from the central government and was diverted from municipal governments. 
Strong societal divides make communal reforms difficult because of the animosity 
between the council, municipal governments, and the society. Councils do not want to 
lose their power among the state despite the patronage networks undermining opposition-
led municipal governments. The reforms, as a result, would have to incorporate civil 
society in order to reach a negotiated settlement allowing for a united working 
relationship and remove the president’s direct access to councils in order to extend 
control.  
2. Military  
The Military, under Chávismo policies, underwent a politicization rendering them 
one of the largest patronage networks in Venezuela. Currently, the military leads all 
social development programs under opaque operations. Article 328 of Venezuela’s 
constitution created a new role for the military as the handlers of social development for 
the state.501 Generals became public administrators of major social development projects 
that operate secretly because of the removal of autonomous oversight and preferential 
status from the president. Promotions procedures were also changed to create a patronage 
network of government loyalists, where the president rewards loyalty with promotions 
and assignments. Article 331 as well as the 2002 Organic law gave the president power to 
approve all military promotions and positions, thus, removing the oversight responsibility 
from the Asamblea Nacional.502 Removing the legislative oversight of the Armed Forces 
allowed the president to ensure loyalty among a powerful institution, which was 
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especially important to Chávez. Chávez viewed the Armed Forces as the representation 
of the Bolivarian Revolution and the only viable institution to ensure his goals. A means 
to remove politicization of the military involves the Venezuelan government returning to 
civilian control.  
Civilian control returns by re-establishing legislative branch oversight and 
replacing the military with a civil servant bureaucracy in social development projects. 
The reforms will de-politicized the forces and remove the president’s uncontested 
control. Social development projects currently place officers within bureaucratic 
positions and at closest proximity to the president. As a result, Harold Trinkunas 
identified that the military had to only answer to the president and were able to replace 
local governments as the main representatives of social development.503 The Venezuelan 
government can rebuild the civil servant bureaucracy to assume the responsibilities of 
social development. A public administration bureaucracy will create civil servants with 
the technical expertise to effectively organize and manage social development programs 
with oversight mechanisms and ethics training to ensure non-corrupt practices of public 
funds.  
3. Public Financial Management  
With the creation of a new civil servant bureaucracy, a professional autonomous 
auditing mechanism is required to provide oversight, like Public Financial Management. 
Public Financial Management (PFM) evaluates public administrations for bribery and 
fraud. The new civil servant bureaucracy as well as communal councils could include 
PFMs to monitor against corrupt practices. PFMs typically incorporate five categories of 
reform: decentralization, public expenditure tracking, revenue and customs, procurement, 
and central budget planning and management. For Venezuela, there anti-corruption 
mechanism would include decentralization, public expenditure tracking, and central 
budget planning.  
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a. Decentralization 
Decentralization will remove the president’s power to lead all decision-making of 
state institutions, like the military. Decentralization means to decentralize decision-
making processes to “reduce extortion capacities of central bureaucrats and increases 
accountability of local politicians to their constituents.”504 The main elements of 
decentralization involve fiscal and revenue gathering, or in other words the ability to 
spend money and collect taxes. In Venezuela, decentralization would remove presidential 
power of the military back to the legislative branch. Also, presidential power of the 
councils will go from the president to the municipal government. Decentralization 
reforms will ensure the citizen’s ability to “provide checks on the state or be allowed to 
participate in the design or monitoring of the reforms.”505 Civil servants in charge of 
social development will also benefit from decentralization. The central government could 
also incorporate fiscal decentralization efforts from the central government down to the 
state and municipal levels. With the communal councils incorporated with the municipal 
governments, oversight on central government funds will remove the parallel status they 
currently operate in, providing another check to the system. This allows the councils to 
continue to provide for their communities in a transparent open environment. 
b. Public Expenditure Tracking 
Another element of PFMs, public expenditure tracking, tracks money in 
institutions. The mechanism follows the “flow of money from central ministries to front-
line agencies, comparing reports with actual expenditure.”506 Current social development 
programs and communal councils lack this oversight. Public expenditure tracking 
requires an inclusion of strong sanctions that incorporate civil society507 into the system. 
For Venezuela, public expenditure tracking requires freedom of movement from the 
central government and provide transparency of operations they monitor. The reforms 
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require autonomous institutions to conduct oversight and laws with financial penalties for 
corrupt practices. Brazil serves as an example of such a public expenditure tracking 
mechanism.  
Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Law or the Clean Companies Act incorporated elements 
of public expenditure tracking among its corporate environment. The law incorporates 
sanctions that include “liability for bribery, incentivize compliance, and facilitate public 
enforcement.”508 The 2015 anticorruption law enacted includes, “specific rules for 
compliance programs and establishes fines and other procedures,” like:  
1. Create criteria for calculating administrative fines, a method for 
recognizing mitigating factors such as cooperation, self-reporting, 
and the existence of prior compliance practices, the value of the 
contract with the government and the economic position of the 
offender. 
2. Specific rules for compliance programs to include procedures for 
establishing codes of conduct and ethics codes, whistleblowing and 
other business integrity provisions that must be adopted into 
Brazil’s companies and monitored according to the size and 
circumstance of the company. 
3. Designate the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union as 
the responsible body for oversight and jurisdiction to start 
investigations and prosecute violations. 
4. Create rules of plea or leniency agreements for offending 
companies who wish to cooperate with authorities and accept their 
responsibility. 
5. Develop a national registry for offending companies.509 
A major element of the sanctions involves high fines and dissolutions “from .1% 
to 20% of the annual gross revenues of the company or three times the benefit sought or 
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received from the misconduct.”510 Venezuela, as a masculine society according to Bryan 
Husted, responds most to financial sanctions then jail sentences.511 As a result, a public 
financial tracking institution similar to Brazil that attaches financial sanctions 
corresponds most with Venezuela’s masculinity tendencies. 
c. Central Budget Planning and Management 
A final PFM element for Venezuela, central budget planning and management, 
provides restrictions of the government’s ability to use public funds to fuel patronage 
networks. Central budget planning and management are meant to strengthen budgets’ 
planning and management procedures within the central government.512 Menocal et.al. 
cite Dorotinsky and Pradhan’s cross-country studies that claim countries that incorporate 
strong budget procedures obtain a lower ranking in the Corruption Perception Index.513 
Venezuela’s constitution allows the president to add “extraordinary budget items,”514 
allowing the budget to be manipulated by presidential whims and unaccounted for. 
Central budget planning and management mechanisms, as a result, would provide a check 
by an external institution to ensure a more clear record of public fund allocations. 
Reforms would manifest in “transparency in accounting, recording, and reporting 
procedures; prevention in fraud analysis; and budget formulation capability.”515 
Autonomous institutions would conduct these evaluations in political institutions. This 
mechanism would also require strong social accountability mechanisms to ensure 
transparency is transmitted to civil society. 
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C. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
State center anti corruption strategies involves the inclusion of civil society 
through strengthening Venezuela’s social accountability mechanisms. Strong social 
accountability instruments strengthen other anti-corruption reforms through the building 
of political will. The components of social accountability institutions are the media and 
the state’s security apparatus. Civil Service groups fill the vacuum left by the state during 
the reform process to build political will and citizen’s trust in the government’s ability to 
realize effective anti-corruption efforts. Table 4 provides the possible social 
accountability reforms. 
Table 4.   Social Accountability Reforms 





The media works exclusively to incorporate citizens into the anti-corruption 
process. Menocal et.al., describes that “freedom of press is an intermediate factor 
moderating the relationship between transparency and accountability.”516The media 
experienced several years of suppression from Chávismo policies. Freedom House’s 
2015 Freedom of the Press report ranked Venezuela Not Free with a score of 81 out of 
100 (zero meaning free and 100 not free).517 An evident rise from their 2002 report that 
had Venezuela ranked Partly Free with a score of 44 out of 100.518 Hugo Chávez 
gradually suppressed media outlets through regulatory and ownership changes that 
circumvented constitutional protections. Chávez legitimized his actions through pushing 
the narrative that the media in Venezuela was an extension of the corrupt politicians of 
Punto Fijo. In 2007, Chávez closed RCTV and in 2009–2010 closed “34 radio stations, 2 
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regional TV stations, 6 cable TV stations, and 2 newspapers.”519 Exploiting polarization 
of society, the Venezuelan government manipulates the media through targeted 
propaganda to gain support on a given situation. Regardless of the government’s 
manipulation of the platform, media is vital in informing citizens and fostering political 
will against corruption, a key element to state center anti-corruption strategies. 
New media reforms necessitate the removal of criminal penalties of libel and 
defamation charges, as well as changes in legislation over the presidential control over 
the media. Currently, article 58 of the constitution provides “free and plural” 
communications for everyone having the right to “timely, truthful, and impartial 
information without censorship, in accordance with the principals of this Constitution, as 
well as the right to reply and corrections when they are directly affected by inaccurate or 
offensive information.”520 Yet, Chávismo’s censorship policies bypass the constitution. 
For example, in 2000, Chávez, gained power to “suspend broadcasting when he judges it 
to be in the interest of the nation.”521 Government enacted judicial reforms in regards to 
defamation, means that the government can go after news outlets and journalists, who 
defame the government with prison sentences of up to 30 months.522 Other government 
reforms included the 2004 Resorte Law, which in 2010 was amended to include more 
restrictions on expression, creating vague language to legitimatize government 
censorship.523 Examples of that censorship included censoring by force, placing 
journalists in jail, harassment, or other acts of violence. Also, journalists are seen 
practicing self-censorship because the government secretly purchased newspapers.524 
Opposition outlets reported shortages in newsprint as well.525 In terms of access to 
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information, citizens are restricted through the nuance of the law that allows the 
government to deny information considered critical to the government.526 The media 
needs clear language in legislation to protect against government’s violations of freedom 
of press rights. 
Social media empowered civil society groups to replace traditional media outlets. 
Currently, social media outlets, like Twitter, assist citizens to find medicines, food, and 
accurate news.527 Venezuela, with the lowest bandwidth in Latin America, has the most 
citizens active on the Internet. Venezuela has 10 million smartphones within the 
country528 and 85% Facebook and Twitter penetration rate.529 Applications like, “Here it 
is” and Transparency International’s anti-corruption app Dilo Aqui, utilizes social media 
to gain direct access to society and circumvent government suppression. Citizens follow 
twitter handles, like @Impacientes Venezuela to find medicine or food and 
@DolarToday to find the day’s black market prices. For news, people rely on Efecto 
Cocuyo, an online news source and Twitter handle @NotiTweets to gain more objective 
news. Politicians also use Twitter to penetrate the middle and upper classes. The low 
bandwidth throughout the state, however, limits exposure to segments of the population. 
Traditional Media reforms allow more free and fair news to expand throughout the state 
where social media cannot reach. Social media will assist to fill the gap until traditional 
media outlets operate more freely.  
2. Security Apparatus 
Another component of social accountability to provide reforms is Venezuela’s 
security apparatus. The security apparatus allows for anti-corruption mechanisms to have 
protections under rule of law to enforce effective sanctions to curb corruption. The 
specific elements of the security apparatus are police and judicial institutions that are 
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found to conduct corrupt practices and increased citizens’ distrust in anti-corruption 
reforms. Reforms in these institutions allow for more transparent operations to preserve 
law and order in the state as well as assist in anti-corruption sanctions. Historically, these 
institutions are perceived as the most corrupt institutions among all of Latin America. 
The ramifications of neglecting these institutions are the inability to suppress violent 
activity and exposure to more intense corrupt practices under an umbrella of impunity.  
a. Police 
Venezuela’s police force suffers from corrupt operations that cripple the 
credibility to uphold potential anti-corruption methods. IEP research identified that 83% 
of Venezuelans view the police as corrupt and high levels of violence are correlated to 
high levels of corruption in police and judicial institutions.530 The citizens, in turn, lose 
trust and safety. The lack of trust in the security apparatus hinders perceptions that 
corrupt actors can be held accountable. In Venezuela, as a result, parallel institutions, like 
the Bikers Union also known as Colectivos,531 are replacing law enforcement by 
introducing patronage practices to suppress subversives to the Venezuelan government. 
Chávez created colectivos, as pro-government armed units that appear more like an 
armed extension of Chávismo politics that suppress opposition voices and further divides 
the state. Along with the colectivos use of violence, 90% of murders in Venezuela go 
unsolved and with the government doctoring the numbers of crime rates denies people an 
accurate picture of the current situation.532 Citizens feel unsafe; with the 2015 Legatum 
Prosperity Index reporting 22.4% of the population feels safe walking at night compared 
to the global average of 61.9%.533 More government transparency allows for an accurate 
picture of how the police are doing and allows citizens to demand accountability. 
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From the police’s perceptive; there are a lack of resources to combat crime and 
corruption. Ryan Duffy states that the police look at the lack of government assistance as 
the problem.534 Police reforms require more resources to curb the motivations of 
corruption. The lack of government providing resources allows for corruption through 
bribes by criminal organizations. Criminal organizations, like the Cartel of the Suns, are 
known to have ties with both police and military officials.535 The Venezuelan 
government needs cooperation among government officials and the local colectivos to fill 
the gap of limited resources. The burden of high crime rates and few police officers 
requires the use of those colectivos to provide support through bodies such as community 
watch efforts and delivering information. The cooperation will remove the central 
government’s ability to manipulate collectivos with patronage practices of resources that 
undermine police operations. Collectivos used to suppress opposition protests in 
aggressive manners536 exacerbate violence. The cooperation with the police will assist in 
rebuilding trust in the security apparatus and regain control to maintain law and order.  
Another factor of police reform creates a means to monitor for police’s 
compliance. Internal affairs equivalent that remains autonomous from the police’s chain 
of command in units provide objective monitoring and accountability. Other reforms 
involve training in both ethics and tactics in police units, which assist in gaining citizens’ 
trust and dissuade corrupt practices. Ethics training provides a culture of zero tolerance 
toward corruption and a safe environment for whistleblowers to report corrupt practices.  
b. Judicial 
The second element of Venezuela’s security apparatus, judicial institutions, can 
use reforms in removing the manipulation of the president. Most judicial reforms in Latin 
American countries have turned to the United States, OAS, and the United Nations, in 
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terms of technical and resource assistance.537 Venezuela’s current attitude toward 
international aid requires political will to gain the necessary acceptance. Guatemala went 
to the UN for help and created the International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG). Impunity remains an issue among the security apparatus that 
involves reforms to judicial institutions. Another reform encompasses maintaining the 
court system’s political independence. The reform would assist the judicial branch to 
investigate, prosecute, and convict individuals against corrupt practices. Regardless of 
political affiliations, the judicial branch should operate independently from the executive.  
3. Anti-Corruption Special Task Force 
A possible solution to incorporate within the judicial branch is the creation of 
autonomous special investigator units and tribunals. The Venezuela’s Special Task Force 
would incorporate specialized police units along with special prosecutors to investigate, 
indict, convict, and ultimately prevent future corruption. This body would be an 
independent institution from the central government in order to prevent politicization and 
freedom of apprehension to go after specific members of government, which has been an 
issue in Venezuela’s court system.538 Powers need to be awarded to the independent 
party in order to provide effective sanctions that are backed by the political will of the 
state’s political elites, in order to prevent undermining of convictions or creating 
loopholes granting exceptions to the law. The task force would also need means to 
monitor and track anti-corruption laws created by the state to ensure their effectiveness as 
well as procedures to provide transparent accounts of institutional procedures.  
Venezuela’s anti-corruption task force can be created with assistance from and 
from IOs, as was the case with Guatemala’s CICIG. CICIG experienced significant 
successes in corruption cases involving the highest levels of government officials and 
removing impunity from high profile officials like Guatemalan President Otto Pérez 
                                                 
537 United States Department of State, “Venezuela 2012 Crime and Safety Report,” (Judicial Bureau 
of Diplomatic Security: United States State Department, January 2012), https://www.osac.gov/pages/
ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13038. 
538 Gates, “The Politics of Corruption in Venezuela.” 
 119 
Molina in 2015.539 The UN provided assistance to Guatemala’s judicial system through 
training and resources. IOs could assist in the creation of an independent body to focus on 
corruption, legitimizing Venezuela’s security apparatus, as well as provide financial and 
political backing. Recommendations from this independent body will further strengthen 
the security apparatus and gain trust from the public. Unfortunately, these reforms 
involve a high level of political will from government officials to incorporate IO 
networks. Given Venezuela’s current political environment, the likelihood of these 
reforms proves difficult to obtain. A counter-argument to the international anti-corruption 
body centers on the idea of an internal body that operates similar to CICIG but without 
international organization’s assistance like Mexico’s latest anti-corruption initiatives.  
Mexico’s new anti-corruption tribunal came from a robust law that deals with 
corruption internally without IO assistance. In 2014, the reforms created unprecedented 
initiatives toward anti-corruption and by 2016; the new anti-corruption reforms were 
signed into law.540 The new laws involved “changing 14 constitutional articles, drafting 2 
new general laws, and reforming five more.”541 The National Anti-corruption System 
created “independent and effective authorities, comprehensive and integrated system of 
administrative responsibilities, a new criminal regime to fight corruption, and a new 
control and oversight system to coordinate state and local authorities.”542 Civil Society 
groups were involved to influence the government over the role of the special prosecutor 
and other issues in relation to the new laws. According to these civil society groups, the 
special prosecutor was “too beholden to the President” and could potentially be used [in] 
partisan attacks.543 Political will was present to enact policies, but at a slow and shallow 
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level of effort. Civil Society groups and the media applied pressure to push reforms 
forward. Analysis from Jesse Heath identifies that delays resulted from “existing 
branches of government [that] are hopelessly corrupt and cannot be trusted to oversee 
anti-corruption efforts.”544 Heath further hypothesizes that a major corruption-related 
scandal could generate political will.545 Either way, Venezuela attempts to create a 
special task force requires provisions to build political will through media influence to 
expose corruption. 
4. Building Political Will 
In order for Venezuela to build political will, the media and security apparatus 
institutions should be able to use corruption scandals as a means to apply pressure to state 
elites. The current corruption scandals that encircles the Mexican President with his 
personal residence are consider minor in terms of typical Latin American scandals; 
however, there influence pushed political will and resulted in the latest laws and reforms 
to the National Anti-corruption System. Corruption scandals of a larger scale, as is the 
case in Brazil, prove to be a viable spark for substantial anti-corruption reform. 
According to Heath, the necessity of Venezuela to strengthen its social accountability 
apparatus is primed to expose “the smoking gun” citizen’s need. The use of civil society 
groups and media to apply pressure proves necessary to build political will, as was the 
case with protests in Brazil assisting in their anti-corruption reforms. In large part, 
corruption scandals can motivate action from both the public and the government to enact 
reforms to combat the issue.  
A major corruption scandal applied pressure to Brazil’s political elites to enact 
anti-corruption reforms. Brazil’s Mensalaõ corruption scandal’s investigations began in 
2005, where “public funds were illegally used to pay members of Congress in exchange 
for backing the government in crucial votes.”546 25 politicians, bankers, and businessmen 
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were convicted.547 Also, within that same year, Brazil signed an anti-corruption law to 
focus on businesses through the creation of firm laws and sanctions for corrupt actions 
such as bribery of public officials.548 For the first time, corporations are liable, not just 
individuals. The law was not perfect, leaving room for interpretation among the states 
and municipalities and exposing the potential of non-standardization to the law, watering 
down its affectability.  
Public outcry over scandals tested anti-corruption efforts and galvanized Brazil. 
The major corruption scandal involves both the state-owned oil company Petrobas and 
government officials. The Petrobas scandal, also known as Operation Car Wash, involves 
bribery schemes from Petrobras executives to government officials to obtain lucrative 
contracts. This scandal incorporated a majority of members of government, from 
congressional members, executive cabinet members, to President Rousseff. In 2015, 
protests flooded the streets over the scandal, demanding impeachment of the President. 
This scandal exposed a significant move for Brazil in terms of going after major members 
of the ruling elite and holding them accountable. Protests forced political will in the part 
of the government to allow for the continuation of anti-corruption investigations and 
provide more judicial power to prosecute the offenders in this scandal. By May 2016, 
President Dilma Rousseff was suspended from office pending an impeachment trial over 
government account manipulation to hide the true state of the economy.549 By September 
2016, she was found guilty and dismissed.550 The media exposure of Brazil’s scandals 
resulted in the public reacting through massive protests throughout the country and the 
political elites being forced to respond. Venezuela’s current protests over the economic 
crisis and calls of corruption from the government serve as a similar example to Brazil’s 
citizen involvement and provide hope in building political will. 
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The mismanagement of Venezuela’s political and economic systems led to 
patronage networks operating under the safety of a high oil price umbrella. Domestic 
patronage networks created between the president and key members of society were what 
maintained Chávez in power. Examples, like cash handouts, promotions, and lucrative 
positions were given in exchange to loyalty. The government’s inability to maintain 
spending and corrupt practices spiraling out of control has motivated the population to 
demand change. Venezuela’s anti-corruption strategy relies on: crucial reforms of the 
economy to a market-friendly social democratic system, reduce patronage networks and 
presidential control in Chávismo’s political system, and rebuild political will and citizen 
engagement through social accountability institutions. Venezuela’s anti-corruption 
strategy could gain validation through examples from two progressive anti-corruption 
laws passed in Mexico and Brazil. The opportunity presented through Venezuela’s 
current crisis allows for anti-corruption policies that consider Venezuela’s societal 
elements to curb Chávez’s legacy of corrupt practices in Venezuela.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Today the immense majority of Venezuelans want change, but similar to 
us, the common citizen and Venezuela’s democracy are incarcerated by 
corrupt elite who is only interested in remaining in power. 
 —Leopold Lopez, May 23, 2015551 
  
A review of post-Chavez Venezuela, demonstrates how Chávismo replaced 
former political elites’ corrupt practices with systematic patrimonial networks. In May 
2009, during the 10th anniversary program of Chávez’s weekly show, Aló Presidente, 
President Chávez called the people to act against corruption at the first signs of it: “the 
party and government need to set the example of transparency and honesty and those who 
know about it should admit it here and now.”552 Despite Chávez’s rally cry, 
Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index identified “Venezuela as 
the most corrupt country in Latin America for the 10th straight year.”553 This thesis 
endeavored to understand the large disparity between Chávez’s anti-corruption rhetoric 
and the steady rise in Venezuela being perceived as corrupt. Specifically, this thesis 
evaluated two factors that assisted in the rise of corruption: weak governance and oil 
overdependence. The thesis also examined various anti-corruption means and proposes 
state center anti-corruption method to help Venezuela. 
This thesis discovered four main findings that identify Venezuela’s current state 
of corruption and the means to incorporate effective anti-corruption methodologies 
against Venezuela’s corrupt landscape, broken down as follows:  
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1. Chávismo populist policies incorporated neo-patrimonial and weak 
governance practices that removed transparency and accountability 
mechanisms. 
2. Cháveznomics economic policies mismanaged oil rents through 
patrimonial and clientelist networks that further the state’s 
dependence on oil under the security of a high oil windfall umbrella.  
3. An analysis of Venezuela’s societal elements of culture, political 
will, and international integration, along with anti-corruption 
theories determined that state-center anti-corruption methodology 
provides the most feasible anti-corruption strategy. 
4. Venezuela’s anti-corruption plan might incorporate a three-prong 
approach that focuses key reforms in economic, political, and 
social accountability arenas in order to build political will and civil 
engagement for a state center anti-corruption strategy. 
 
The first two findings center analysis on the reasons why corruption rose within 
2000–2014 from two of Chávez’s main policies: Chávismo and Cháveznomics. Those 
policies incorporated socialist strategies within a populist government, which resulted in 
patrimonial networks and weakening of transparency and accountability. The last two 
findings link anti-corruption theory and Venezuela’s societal elements in order to 
recommend policies to curb corruption’s rise.  
Chapter VI synthesizes the key findings while also providing future research 
suggestions for the study of corruption in populist governments. The focus specifically 
centers on the causes of the rise in the perception of corruption during the height of Hugo 
Chávez’s presidency (2000–2014) through policy analysis of Chávismo and 
Cháveznomics. Also, the thesis reviews anti-corruption methodology and Venezuela’s 
societal elements by arguing the reason for using state center anti-corruption strategies. 
This chapter compares proposed policy recommendations with Mexican and Brazilian anti-
corruption policy examples to find strength in their validity for Venezuela. Finally, Chapter 
VI provides opportunities for future research on populist governments anti-corruption 
methodologies. 
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A. FIRST FINDING: WEAK GOVERNANCE THROUGH CHÁVISMO 
POLICIES 
Venezuela’s Chávismo policies incorporate populist and neo-patrimonial systems 
that rely on gaining favor among specific segments of society at the expense of 
transparency and accountability. While weak governance is not new for Venezuela, the 
incorporation of Hugo Chávez’s form of governance proved detrimental. According to 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Venezuela showed a decline 
of governance over the inception of the Chávismo political model in five governance 
indicators. For example, figure 4 shows Venezuela’s decline in governance within the 
World Bank’s WGI rankings from the year Chávez entered office in 1998 until 2014. 
According to the World Banks’ methodology, the higher the percentage signifies stronger 
governance. By 2014, the indicators show a decline in their percentile rankings, 
especially in government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption indicators. Weak Governance appears as a by-product of Chávez’s new form 
of government through key institutional practices. 
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Figure 4.  1998-2014 World Governance Indicator for Venezuela, RB554 
During this 14-year period that the thesis highlights, Chávez implemented populist 
policies to include: redistribution of wealth through social programs, reduction of 
corruption through polarizing rhetoric, and centralization of power at the executive. One of 
the main policy drivers, concentrated power to President Chávez, involved removing 
external accountability and transparency mechanisms within key institutions. Chávez also 
placed key government loyalists, or Chavistas, in lucrative positions within the Chávismo 
political machine to ensure loyalty through neo-patrimonial systems. These neo-
patrimonial systems operated through individuals being rewarded for their loyalty through 
various incentives. These incentives included social development projects and beneficial 
positions within the military and government ministries, allowing Chávez and his pseudo 
political party, Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), to remain in power. 
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Corruption provides the catalyst for populist political machines to gain traction, 
which was the case with the previous political system, Pacto de Punto Fijo and the 
incorporation of Chávismo. The corrupt practices, consequently, originated between two 
major parties, AD and COPEI, to ensure that power and oil rents remained among them. 
Venezuela’s economic struggles during Punto Fijo made their once accepted corrupt 
practices unacceptable. Jennifer McCoy and Leslie Gates both argue that corrupt 
practices maintain stability.555 The stability, however, was not enough for the 
Venezuelan citizen to support under the economic crisis. In 1989, Venezuela’s economy 
experienced average consumer price inflation of 84.63%,556 because of previous years 
drop in oil prices by 67%.557 Citizen’s riots attack the government’s total incompetence 
to deal with the economy and ramped corruption. These sentiments primed the state for a 
populist form of governance. Thus, Hugo Chávez capitalized on these sentiments and 
won the presidential election in 1998. 
Populism was the tool that Chávez utilized to win the presidency and cement 
Chávismo corrupt practices within the political system. The elements of populism used 
involved centralizing control of executive and polarizing rhetoric. Consolidating power to 
the executive was the argument populist leaders claim would eradicate corruption and 
redistribute wealth to the poor. This policy further deteriorated governance while 
institutionalized clientelist networks. The polarizing rhetoric was another tool used to 
create divisions between the ruling class and the poor, with the image of corrupt 
politicians diverting oil rents from the poor to fill their own pockets.558 The rhetoric later 
evolved toward creating the image that any new opposition would remove all government 
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aid apparatus. As a result, Chávismo political model, rather then remove the practice of 
corruption, instead weaken institutions and incorporated systematic corrupt practices to 
encompass more members of society.  
B. SECOND FINDING: CHÁVEZNOMICS POLICIES OVER OIL OVER-
DEPENDENCE 
Oil over-dependence dogma, under the protection of high oil prices, was the 
second contributing factor as to why Venezuela’s corruption rose. Venezuela has the 
largest known oil reserves in the world559 and, along with its high profitability, 
encourages the state’s dependence on rents to fuel their patronage networks. Chávez’s 
economic model, Cháveznomics, entailed redistributing oil rents to the citizens. 
Redistribution procedures manifested into robust social development projects, with the 
goal to create a socialist society of communes and state controlled industries. 
Unfortunately, the neo-patrimonial networks in communes and state controlled industries 
incorporated corrupt practices where Chavistas gain benefit at the expense of the state. 
For example, black markets started to surface that exacerbated food shortages and 
inflation throughout the state where the middle and upper classes benefited at the expense 
of the poor.560 When oil prices were at its highest, Venezuela benefited from the influx of 
oil revenues that shielded the corrupt practices. The policies were only possible and 
lauded as successful when the price of oil was high; however, once the price dropped, 
Chávez’s admirable aspirations proved a curse for Venezuela’s economy.  
Venezuela’s economic situation closely resembles the potential situations 
described by the Resource Curse theory. The theory describes how governments with a 
rich resource create a “dependent, inflated economy that leads to conflict, corruption, and 
poverty.”561 The theory hinges on the idea of a state relying exclusively on the resource 
at the detriment of other industries (Dutch Disease) and uses resource rents to fund their 
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own prerogatives (Rentier State). Dutch Disease and Rentier State are two outcomes that 
manifested in Venezuela’s economic situation due to the mismanagement of 
Cháveznomics. The rich oil price umbrella that Chávez operated under allowed corrupt 
operations to function unopposed and exaggerated Rentier State outcomes, such as 
patronage networks.  
A main Cháveznomics policy consists of presidential control of the economy. The 
control allows for the manipulation of economic institutions and industries like state oil 
company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). These state industries oversight was 
removed from other branches of government, allowing the president to use them as 
presidential piggy banks. From 2005 to 2009, 90% of PDVSA’s oil revenues went toward 
social programs and a windfall management mechanism, National Development Fund 
(FONDEN).562 While FONDEN was meant to act as a safety net for the state in case of 
oil market busts, it was also directly managed by the president. As a result, PDVSA lost 
control to remain competitive,563while Chávez was able to use oil rents to serve his 
prerogatives. 
Chávez economic controls also involved the manipulations of PDVSA’s top 
executives. In 2002 and 2003, PDVSA technocrats revolted against Cháveznomics 
policies, resulting into a coup attempt and PDVSA strikes.564 The coup ended in a failure 
to remove Chávez from power, demolished production levels that have yet to recover, 
and radicalized socialist objectives.565 Chávez reacted to these confrontations with the 
replacement of PDVSA executives with Chavistas, whose only credentials were their 
loyalty to the government, with Francisco Rodriguez describing the actions as resulting in 
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the deterioration of PDVSA technical base, which affected their production capacity.566 
The fragile position of their economic stronghold along with the state’s overreliance on 
its revenue led Venezuela down a precarious and unsustainable situation.  
The centralized presidential control of the economy has also removed the ability 
of accountability agencies to ensure transparency and responsibility of public funds 
among state institutions. Institutions like Venezuela’s misiones operate under opaque and 
secret processes. For example, Kirk Hawkins describes how the misiones are controlled 
directly by the president, removing any third-party oversight.567 As a result, the 
government’s secret operations568 allow those programs to be used as pro-government 
tools rather than substantial social development. Currently, the state lacks documentation 
showing the amounts of funds taken from PDVSA’s coffers to fund the president’s 
programs.569 Despite those attributes, the government lauded successes in reductions of 
poverty and exposure to education and health care to the poorest segments of society.570 
Nevertheless, the lack of long-term goals to elevate the poor gives little or no sense of 
relief in Venezuelans citizens.  
C. THIRD FINDING: STATE-CENTER ANTI-CORRUPTION 
METHODOLOGY 
In order for states to diminish corruption, the people can incorporate appropriate 
anti-corruption policies within their governmental structures. Scholars divide anti-
corruption methodology into four theoretical approaches: universalistic, state-center, 
society-centric, and critical school. These schools are distinguished by how they 
approach the main drivers of anti-corruption policies: domestic leaders, civil society, 
international organizations, or power institutions.571 Chapter IV examined anti-corruption 
theoretical approaches and weighed the potential benefits from those approaches together 
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with the corrupt practices that currently exist in Venezuela so as to suggest a specific, 
concrete, effective anti-corruption policy.  
This thesis recommends a state-center approach for Venezuela, which would 
allow decision-makers the ability to incorporate informal institutions in preventing 
corruption. Universalistic, society-centric, and critical school anti-corruption strategies 
would not function, as effectively in Venezuela, mostly due to the country’s apprehension 
regarding international integration, weak political will, and current lack of social 
accountability mechanisms. The state-center methodology allows for state leaders to 
incorporate elements of the political system and direct participation in order to involve 
civil society in effective anti-corruption strategies. 
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, effective anti-corruption methodology involves 
understanding the societal factors that would shape decision makers, specifically: culture, 
political will, and international integration. The cultural considerations, according to 
Geertz Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, illustrate Venezuela as a masculine, collectivist, 
high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance society.572 Considering that 
Venezuela shares both types of corruption (principal-agent and collective-action), state-
center strategies would permit decision-makers the latitude to tackle corruption on an 
individual level, focusing on state actors as well as the institutional frameworks that 
facilitated corruption in the first place.  
D. FOURTH FINDING: VENEZUELA’S STATE CENTER ANTI-
CORRUPTION PLAN 
Considering the theoretical implications of anti-corruption along with 
Venezuela’s societal factors allows for a depth understanding of effective anti-corruption 
solutions. Chapter V presented possible reforms and anti-corruption solutions under three 
societal categories: economic, political, and social accountability. The main objective of 
these possible solutions targets key Chávismo and Cháveznomics policies in order to root 
out corruption from its fundamental causes: weak governance and oil over-dependence. 
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The large interwoven patronage and clientelist networks that resulted from Hugo 
Chávez’s policies necessitates a three-prong, state-center anti-corruption solution. 
The goal of Venezuela’s strategy involves incorporating a market-friendly social 
democratic system, reducing patronage networks, limiting presidential control, and 
rebuilding political will and citizen engagement. Since the current Chávismo policies did 
not allow for opposition toward the government, the thesis’s recommended reforms target 
key elements of the political, economic, and social accountability mechanisms so as to 
increase transparency and accountability. To interject accountability, for example, a 
possible policy reform involves lessening presidential control of institutions by returning 
oversight to the National Assembly or a third party institution. Oversight mechanisms can 
remove the potential of patronage networks from the president down to Chavistas, as well 
as boast citizen’s trust in the system.  
Since political will and citizen engagement were modified by patronage networks 
in order for Chávez to maintain control at the expense of transparency and accountability, 
reforms should rebuild transparency and accountability mechanisms. As a result, reforms 
would involve policies to reestablish the confidence and security in order empower 
citizens to hold their government accountable. Key institutions, like the judiciary and 
police, require reforms to boost their ability to serve the interests of the citizen as well as 
create new laws protecting whistleblowers. A recommendation in this category is the 
creation of an anti-corruption tribunal in order to investigate, prosecute, convict, and 
monitor corruption practices. This tribunal requires independence from the president in 
order to work effectively against any corrupt individual or institution. 
Venezuela’s decision-makers can rely on the examples of Mexico and Brazil, in 
order to gain perspective on anti-corruption reforms. Both Mexico and Brazil share a 
similar situation with Venezuela in terms of its political and economic outlooks, like state 
owned industries and cultural similarities. This thesis compared possible anti-corruption 
reforms against Mexican and Brazilian attempted anti-corruption reforms. For example, 
Mexico and Brazil implemented the following market-friendly economic models: 
“consolidated market reforms, targeted social development, and obedience to democratic 
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norms and procedures.”573 Brazil specifically used market-friendly reform through 
implementation of social development projects like Bolsa Familia that incorporated 
longer-term outcomes, like increasing human capital.574 Mexico also conducted reforms 
that involved privatization of state monopolies, pointed social spending to replace 
political patronage, and diversification of their economy.575 Considering the shared 
history among all three countries, Venezuela decision-makers can rely on Brazilian and 
Mexican examples to avoid reinventing possible anti-corruption solutions.  
E. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Three main ideas that corruption and anti-corruption research could focus on are 
populist leftist governance and corruption, difference between citizens versus 
international community’s perceptions of corruption, and state-specific anti-corruption 
methods. Corruption research takes a different significance in Latin America than in the 
past, since the demand for justice from the public influences political decision makers to 
act more than before. Brian Winter said in a forum over Latin America corruption, there 
are a change in citizen’s interest towards intolerance for corruption and a “huge hunger in 
resolving it.”576 Corruption requires a more specialized state study versus a general 
global topic that can have a simplified one-size-fits-all approach.  
The first research topic involves populist governments and corruption. While 
there is growing research in the trend of Latin American states going toward leftist 
populist governments in the late 1990s, the study of those governments and corruption 
remains limited. For Venezuela, there is limited research in the policies of Hugo Chávez 
and corrupt practices. Considering the impact of Hugo Chávez and the “Pink Tide” of 
leftist populist polities in the region serves as justification for more in depth exploration 
of corruption within these types of political regimes. Yet there seems to be little to find 
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corruption exportation within other populist governments. Thus, the research can provide 
a glimpse on how corruption manifests in Latin American 21st century populist 
governments.  
The second possible future research avenue would involve the difference in 
perception between the citizens and the international community. For example, Gregory 
Wilpert argues how Venezuela’s score from Latinobarometro and Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer show corruption less of an issue versus the 
Corruption Perception Index.577 There is limited research on the reason for the disparity. 
The potential question here is what level of tolerance does citizens have with corrupt 
practices? Or even, what do citizens consider corrupt? The research could assist decision-
makers in the creation of anti-corruption mechanism that would be acceptable to citizens 
and tackle the root issues of the state.  
Finally, the third research focus centers on more state-specific tailored anti-
corruption strategies. The state specific emphasis requires tools to accomplish analysis of 
societal elements involved in tackling corruption. This research would also question 
previous attempts at anti-corruption through international organizations. International 
organizations employed a one-size-fits-all strategy in order to export anti-corruption tool-
kits throughout the world. The issue with generalized global strategies assumes 
corruption manifests in the same way throughout the world, with little emphasis paid on 
the individual countries. Analysis of how countries approach corruption is also relevant, 
but cannot exclude their political and societal culture. For example, impunity is a major 
element of anti-corruption policies in specific parts of Latin America that does not hold 
the same significance in Venezuela. Guatemala serves as an example of a country whose 
anti-corruption focuses on fighting impunity because of laws that protect political leaders 
from certain levels of prosecution.578 Anti-corruption analysis should involve specific 
societal implementations that allows for modifications of anti-corruption strategies.  
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The three potential avenues for future research allow corruption to gain a more 
tailored focus rather than a generality. The idea of providing a one-size-fits-all method to 
deal with the issue removes the details of the issue within a society that make it unique 
against another state. One-size-fits-all solutions also assume that every state has the same 
elements of corruption within its societies. As a result, there can manifest a lack of state 
emphasis on the issue of corruption and it become more of a problem tackled by NGOs or 
international organizations, whose motivations may be question and lack public support. 
Also, the results of these organizations will be less effective. There inefficiencies could 
result from their need to gain coalition among the state for political or economic backing 
or even gain public support, versus initiatives supported and pushed by state elites. 
Finally, generalized anti-corruption methods can omit how citizens and past practices 
factor into the development of anti-corruption methodologies. This thesis analysis of 
Venezuela can serve as the beta for study of corruption and creating anti-corruption 
solutions in a similar fashion to how their populist approach in 1998 sparked the turn 
toward leftist populist governments in the region.  
My research regarding Hugo Chávez’s influence on Venezuela showed that 
Chávismo policies ultimately proved to be a populist, neo-patrimonial system, weakening 
governance through presidential control, creating a debilitating dependence on oil rents, 
and therefore increasing opportunities for corruption. I recommend a state center anti-
corruption strategy focused on the Venezuelan government implementing market-friendly 
social democratic reforms in order to reduce presidential control, rebuild political will, 
and strengthen civil engagement. As Venezuela’s history shows, a state-center anti-
corruption strategy would be optimal for reducing corruption and rehabilitating 
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